ERA24FA217

The pilot’s flight into convective weather, which resulted in a loss of control due to spatial disorientation and a subsequent inflight breakup of the airplane. Contributing to the accident was the lack of accurate weather intensity depiction on the controller’s display, which limited the controller’s ability to warn the pilot of hazardous weather along the route of flight.

The pilot and two passengers were about 380 nautical miles (nm) into a planned 550nm, instrument flight rules (IFR) flight; the pilot was in communication with air traffic control. After flying at an altitude of about 7,000 ft mean sea level (msl) for a majority of the flight, the pilot requested to fly at 9,000 ft msl, as well as minor course deviations. The deviation requests were likely for weather avoidance although the pilot gave no explanation, and the controllers did not request the reason for the pilot’s requests. The controller assigned a heading to the north, informing the pilot that the turn north would be temporary and to expect a turn back to the original course; the pilot acknowledged the clearance and turned north. Weather data indicated that, as the airplane was climbing through 9,400 ft msl, it likely encountered light to moderate rain showers and updrafts. The controller then cleared the pilot to resume his previously assigned route; however, the pilot continued on his northerly heading and remained at 9,500 ft msl. The controller made several requests to the pilot to descend as he remained above 9,000 ft msl. The airplane then turned to the northeast, flying further into a significant area of developing convective weather with rain showers and updrafts. After another request by the controller, the pilot responded, “Uh descending to nine thousand for four seven whiskey.” There were no further communications from the pilot. A performance study based on ADS-B data indicated that, about 1 minute after the last transmission, while on a track of about 070° and at a groundspeed of 180 kts (calibrated airspeed 152 kts), the airplane entered a tightening right turn and began to descend. Initially, the descent rate did not exceed 3,000 ft per minute (fpm) but then rapidly increased to over 10,000 fpm while continuing in the right turn. Dispersal of the airplane wreckage was indicative of an inflight breakup. Examination of the airplane and engine revealed no evidence of a pre-accident anomaly that would have prevented normal operation. The area of moderate precipitation encountered by the flight was not displayed on the controller’s standard terminal automation replacement system (STARS) display. A postaccident review of the weather information available to the controller on the STARS display showed that the display was underreporting the weather intensity. Due to this underreporting, the weather intensity depiction on the controller’s display showed no available weather near the accident airplane at the time of the accident and limited the controller’s ability to accurately warn the pilot of hazardous weather along the route of flight. Further investigation indicated that the primary reason the storm was not displayed to the controller was that the developing storm was initially too small to survive the spatial smoothing processing of the facility’s radar system. Based on the airplane’s flight track data, it likely encountered strong updrafts while in growing areas of precipitation and instrument meteorological conditions, which ultimately resulted in the pilot’s spatial disorientation, loss of airplane control, and an in-flight breakup as aerodynamic forces on the airplane exceeded the structural integrity of the airframe. Contributing to the accident was the anomalous and intermittent display of weather intensity on the controller’s STARS display, which prevented his ability to accurately warn the pilot of hazardous weather.

Previously, the pilot had owned a Piper PA-28R-201T (N38201) for several years; according to the pilot’s logbook, he had accumulated 348.2 total hours and 22.2 hours of actual instrument flight time when he sold the airplane in September 26, 2023. The pilot subsequently purchased N47WT on November 29, 2023. A review of his pilot logbook revealed that he had accumulated 366.4 total hours of flight experience, with 18.2 hours in the accident airplane make and model and 22.9 hours of actual instrument flight time. Review of maintenance records revealed compliance with Airworthiness Directive (AD) 94-20-04R2 on June 2, 2021. The AD required ruddervator inspections and modifications on the accident airplane make and model and also made the repetitive visual inspection of the empennage, aft fuselage, and ruddervator control system a one-time action with any subsequent repair and setting of the elevator controls, rudder and tab system controls, cable tensions, and rigging. The AD also added repetitive inspections of the fuselage and bulkheads that were required by the original AD (94-20-04.) The AD was the result of the need to add a repetitive inspection of the fuselage bulkheads and change other inspections from a repetitive to a one-time action. The actions specified by the AD were intended to prevent structural failure of the V-tail. On May 27, 2022, at 5,546.3 hours total time airframe, the ruddervator was repaired under the “Ruddervator Approved Repairs,” REV 6-6-2020 per the FAA-approved special repair process. It was subsequently inspected per the AD. An autopsy of the pilot was performed by the Center for Forensic Medicine, Office of the Medical Examiner, Nashville, Tennessee. According to the autopsy report, the cause of death was blunt force injuries, and the manner of death was accident. Toxicology testing performed at NMS Labs in Horsham, Pennsylvania, on behalf of the Nashville, Tennessee, Medical examiner indicated no positive findings. The FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, found no evidence of carboxyhemoglobin, ethanol, glucose, or drugs of abuse for the pilot. No medications were found that would have likely contributed to the accident. As the daughter of the pilot was also a student pilot and had access to the airplane controls, an autopsy was conducted; the autopsy of the student pilot was performed by the Center for Forensic Medicine, Office of the Medical Examiner, Nashville, Tennessee. According to the autopsy report, the cause of death of the student pilot was blunt force injuries and the manner of death was accident. Toxicology testing performed at NMS Labs in Horsham, Pennsylvania, on behalf of the Nashville, Tennessee, Medical examiner indicated no positive findings. The FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, found no evidence of carboxyhemoglobin, ethanol, glucose, or drugs of abuse for the student pilot. No medications were found that would have likely contributed to the accident. On May 15, 2024, at 1202 central daylight time (CDT), a Beech V35-TC airplane, N47WT, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Franklin, Tennessee. The pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The pilot departed from Louisiana Regional Airport (REG), Gonzales, Louisiana, on an IFR flight plan about 0850 and was enroute to Bowman Field Airport, Louisville, Kentucky, to pick up an additional passenger before returning to REG. The planned flight was about 550 nm. ADS-B data provided by the FAA showed that about 15 minutes into the flight the pilot climbed the airplane to 9,000 ft msl and leveled off on a track of about 027°. In the vicinity of the Mississippi border, the pilot descended to 7,000 ft msl, where he remained until approaching Nashville International Airport (BNA), Nashville, Tennessee airspace, which was about 351 nm from REG. The pilot was in communication with the Memphis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) prior to entering the BNA approach controller’s airspace. Audio communications information provided by the FAA revealed that the pilot requested a deviation from the ARTCC controller, which was passed along to the BNA approach controller prior to communications transfer from ARTCC to BNA approach. The deviation was approved, but the reason for the deviation was not mentioned by the pilot nor did the controller inquire. In addition, the pilot requested a higher altitude, which was coordinated with the ARTCC controller by the approach controller and was approved. During the climb to 9,000 ft msl, the pilot was instructed to fly a heading of 360° (for traffic) and advised to, “then expect on course in probably about fifteen miles.” There was no response from the pilot. About a minute and a half later the controller cleared the pilot to fly direct to the EWO (New Hope, Kentucky) VORTAC, and the pilot acknowledged the clearance; however, he did not make the necessary turn to the right and continued on a northerly heading. The airplane climbed to 9,500 ft msl before the controller instructed the pilot to maintain 9,000 ft msl. Over the following 45 seconds, the controller again asked the pilot to descend to 9,000 ft msl and provided the current altimeter setting; the pilot responded with “uh descending to nine thousand four seven whiskey tango.” This was the last transmission received from the flight. A performance study based on ADS-B data indicated that, about 1 minute after the pilot’s last transmission, while on a track of about 070° and a groundspeed of 180 kts (calibrated airspeed 152 kts), the airplane turned into a tightening right turn before the airplane began to descend. Initially, the rate of descent did not exceed 3,000 fpm as the airplane’s groundspeed increased to over 200 kts. When the groundspeed was more than 210 kts, the descent rate rapidly increased in the right turn to over 10,000 fpm (see figure 1). Figure 1. End of flight altitude, groundspeed, calibrated airspeed, and rate of climb/descent. The debris field began on the eastern side of I-840 and concluded at a lake where the engine was discovered about 3,800 ft west. Airplane and personal effects debris were found on the highway, in heavily wooded terrain, and across residential properties. A witness located outside of his home near the accident site stated that he was sitting on the front porch looking towards the west when he heard a loud “smack noise, like a strap smacking a metal roof or a loud whip.” The noise caused him to look up, and he saw the airplane breaking apart. There was no fire and no smoke. He observed parts of the airplane as they fell to the ground and he could hear and see the parts striking the ground around him, including a wing that impacted his neighbor’s yard. He described the weather at the time of the accident as “super windy” and noted it was beginning to rain. About 2 minutes after the accident, it began to rain “very hard.” The wreckage was scattered and highly dispersed; it was oriented on a 262° magnetic heading and spread over 3,800 ft. The first pieces of wreckage recovered at the beginning of the wreckage path consisted of the separated elevator-rudders (ruddervators) that were found at an elevation of 909 ft. Both wings separated from the fuselage and were found about 2,000 ft further west, followed by the main fuselage fragments, seats, and instrument panel. The engine and propeller assembly was discovered at the end of the wreckage path; it impacted a lake and was submerged in 8 ft of water. About 90% of the airplane was recovered. The left wing separated from the fuselage at the root and was largely intact. Blue fuel consistent with the smell of aviation gasoline spilled out from the main fuel tank at the wing root. The left wingtip fuel tank was intact and contained no fuel. The top, forward