ERA24FA283

The pilot’s loss of airplane control in flight due to spatial disorientation during a climb to cruise altitude in instrument meteorological conditions and turbulence, which resulted in the in-flight breakup of the airplane. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s continued flight into an area of known convective activity.

The pilot filed an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan from the departure airport with an estimated time en route of 2 hours 47 minutes and a cruising altitude of 12,000 ft mean sea level (msl). The flight planning application the pilot used to file the flight plan provided weather briefing information, which included a convective SIGMET active for the time and route of flight and pilot weather reports (PIREPs) for turbulence and moderate chop; however, it could not be determined whether the pilot reviewed this information. The flight departed about 45 minutes after the pilot’s filed departure time. Flight track data and air traffic control communications showed that, about 1 minute after departing, the pilot contacted air traffic control (ATC) to obtain an IFR clearance. The controller cleared the pilot to his destination as filed, issued a climb to 10,000 ft msl, and provided a weather advisory for moderate and heavy precipitation along the route, which the pilot acknowledged. About 4 minutes later, the controller issued the pilot a climb to 12,000 ft msl, which the pilot acknowledged. About that time, the controller began a position relief briefing with a relieving controller, which took about 2 minutes. About 2 minutes later, the new controller queried the pilot after observing that the flight had deviated left of course. The flight track data showed that, just before the query from the controller, the airplane deviated from its southwesterly ground track and began a 45-second, right 270° turn starting at an altitude of 9,800 ft msl. While in the turn, the airplane descended to an altitude of 8,700 ft msl before climbing back to an altitude of 9,800 ft msl when the airplane rolled out on an easterly ground track. About 1 minute after the query from the controller, the pilot responded, stating he had “lost” something, followed by a similar transmission 27 seconds later. This was the last transmission heard that could be attributed to the accident airplane. The airplane continued on a wavering east track for about 40 seconds, descending back down to 8,700 ft msl before climbing to 9,025 ft msl, after which the airplane entered a tight, right, descending spiral until track data was lost. Postaccident examination of the engine and airframe found no evidence of any malfunction or failure that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. All fracture surface and control cable separation features were consistent with overload failure. The distribution of the wreckage was consistent with an in-flight breakup of the airplane. The pilot’s recency and currency flying in actual instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) could not be determined. A pilot who had previously flown with the accident pilot reported that, during their last flight together (about 8 months before the accident), the accident pilot engaged the autopilot no later than 5,000 ft above ground level (agl) and continued to use the autopilot for nearly the entire flight. He also reported that, while en route, the pilot used a tablet computer to continue monitoring the weather, including looking at the weather radar. However, based on the accident flight’s heading and altitude deviations were not consistent with the autopilot being engaged; thus, it is likely the pilot was hand-flying the airplane. A convective SIGMET was active for the area and time of the accident. Weather radar near the time of the accident showed areas of light to heavy or extreme values of reflectivity consistent with convective activity. The cloud bases for the area were between 4,400 ft and 8,900 ft mean sea level (msl) with cloud tops between 12,500 ft and 14,500 ft msl. Based on the available weather information, the accident airplane likely entered IMC about 3 and a half minutes before the accident. Further, the accident airplane likely would have encountered moderate to severe turbulence, based on previous pilot reports and the proximity to the convective activity. The reduced visibility, turbulence, flight without use of the autopilot, and distraction to regain the proper course would have been conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. The resulting ground track, rapid turning descent, and in-flight breakup were consistent with a loss of control as a result of spatial disorientation. A review of the ATC services revealed that, although the controller who informed the pilot about moderate and heavy precipitation did not use standard phraseology and did not include an area of extreme precipitation, this did not contribute to the accident. Similarly, the relieving controller’s use of nonstandard phraseology when providing the hazardous inflight weather advisory was not contributory.

The pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane. No logbooks could be located for the pilot, therefore his recent experience operating in actual instrument meteorological conditions could not be determined. Another pilot, a retired airline captain who had previously flown with the accident pilot, reported that the last time they flew together was in September 2023. He described that flight, stating that the accident pilot was prudent with his checking of the weather both en route and at the destination and that he had performed a thorough preflight inspection. He stated that the accident pilot used the autopilot once airborne, engaging it “no later than 5,000 [ft agl]” and continued to use the autopilot for nearly the entire flight. He also reported that, while en route, the pilot used a tablet computer to continue monitoring the weather, which included looking at the weather radar. The New York (Delaware County) Medical Examiner ruled the cause of death for the pilot as multiple blunt force injuries and the manner of death for the pilot as accident. The FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory performed toxicological testing of postmortem specimens from the pilot. Losartan was detected in liver and muscle tissue. Losartan (Cozaar) is an ACE-II inhibitor-type antihypertensive used to treat high blood pressure and is acceptable for pilots. On June 30, 2024, at 1355 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-46-310P airplane, N85PG, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Trout Creek, New York. The private pilot and four passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The pilot filed an IFR flight plan from Albert S Nader Regional Airport (N66), Oneonta, New York, to West Virginia International Yeager Airport (CRW), Charleston, West Virginia. The flight plan indicated an en route time of 2 hours 47 minutes, the amount of fuel onboard as 5 hours 34 minutes, a cruising altitude of 12,000 ft msl, and a departure time of 1300. A review of flight track data showed the airplane departed N66 at 1343 and was climbing on a southwesterly ground track when the pilot contacted ATC requesting an IFR clearance. A controller at the Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) acknowledged, provided the pilot a discrete transponder code, and identified the airplane’s location 5 miles southwest of N66. The controller then issued the pilot an IFR clearance to CRW “as filed” and issued an instruction to climb to 10,000 ft msl. The pilot acknowledged and continued to climb toward the southwest en route to LOPEZ, the first fix noted on the filed flight plan. The flight track in the climb included multiple deviations left and right of course, which continued for the duration of the flight. At 1345, the controller reported to the pilot that there were areas of moderate to heavy precipitation off his right side that would continue for the next 30 miles and that it was “mostly clear after that.” At 1349, the controller issued the pilot a climb to his filed cruising altitude of 12,000 ft msl. The pilot acknowledged and continued en route with no noticeable deviations in flight track heading until 1352. Between 1349:55 and 1351:21, the controller who had been communicating with the pilot provided a position relief briefing to the relieving controller. (See the “Air Traffic Control Services” section for more information.) At 1352, the airplane’s flight track began a left turn from a heading of 208° to a heading of 166°. At 1353:28, the controller who had just assumed position duties queried the pilot stating, “it looks like you’re deviating left for weather, and what fix do you want to go, uh, downstream to?” The pilot did not immediately respond. At 1353:22, the flight track had begun a right descending turn from a heading of 171° and altitude of 9,800 ft msl to a heading of 127° at 1354:07. During the turn, the airplane descended to its lowest altitude of 8,700 ft msl before climbing back up to 9,600 ft msl. The controller twice more queried the flight before the pilot responded at 1354:05, stating, “yeah I lost.” During this transmission, an unknown person was heard stating, “oh my god.” At 1354:32, the pilot again stated, “yeah, Boston I, I, lost.” This was the last discernable transmission that could be attributed to the accident flight. The airplane then continued on an east-southeast heading with altitude deviations from 9,950 ft msl to 8,700 ft msl. At 1354:43, the airplane climbed from 8,800 ft msl to 9,025 ft msl before it began a steep right turn that tightened during the descent. The last flight track data point, at 1354:59, showed the airplane at an altitude of 6,500 ft msl. The main wreckage was located about 0.5 miles north of this data point. A witness located east of the final portion of the flight track reported seeing the airplane going through dark clouds, then pitching up into the clouds before it “dove into a corkscrew downward.” Another witness, also located east of the final portion of the flight track, reported seeing the airplane flying into the dark clouds before it pitched up and “did a backwards flip and spun.” The wreckage was dispersed over about 1.1 miles from the furthest piece found to the main wreckage site (see figure). The main wreckage consisted of the fuselage, engine, left wing and left flight control surfaces, and root of the right wing, including the right main landing gear. The main wreckage, was oriented on a 041° magnetic heading at an elevation of 1,932 ft msl in dense tree cover. There was no obvious flightpath or tree damage, which is consistent with a near-vertical impact. The fuselage was found lying on its right side and partially buried in the ground at the base of several large trees. The cabin top had been cut and portions removed by first responders. The upper half of the cabin door and the emergency exit door were located adjacent to the fuselage, along with some of the cabin seats and cushions, and a number of interior trim panels. Portions of the flight control cables were visible through fractures in the lower fuselage skin, but the continuity from the wing spar to the cockpit controls could not be confirmed due to the extensive crushing of the fuselage. The vertical stabilizer was found separated from the tailcone and located in the debris field about 5,800 ft from the fuselage, and the rudder was found separated from its hinges and located about 5,920 ft from the fuselage. The horizontal stabilizer, elevator, and trim tab were located in the debris field about 4,500 ft from the fuselage. The elevator remained attached to the horizontal stabilizer, and the elevator trim tab remained attached to the elevator. The left wing remained partially attached to the fuselage by the forward wing attach fitting. The left aileron and flap were separated from the wing and located in the debris field adjacent to the left wing and fuselage. The right wing outboard of the landing gear was found separated chordwise and located in the debris field about 3,600 ft from the fuselage. The right aileron and flap were also found separated from the wing and located in the debris field about 4,500 ft and 5,700 ft from the fuselage, respectively. Control cable continuity to the elevator and rudder was confirmed from just aft of the main wing spar center section to their terminations in the tailcone. The left aileron drive cable was found separated from the sector and was continuous to the center section of the fuselage. The balance cable remained attached to the left sector and was found separated at the side of the fuselage, and the separated cable strands exhibited a “broomstrawed” appearance, consistent with failure under overload. The right aileron drive cable remained attached to the sector and was continuous to a separ