MIA06FA022

Aircraft 1 The failure of both pilot's to maintain visual lookout resulting in the mid-air collision. A factor in the accident was the failure of the AS-350B pilot to follow approach procedures suggested in the Speedway Heliport Operations Manual. Findings in the investigation were the intentional operation of the EC 130 B4 helicopter by the pilot with known deficiencies in equipment (inoperative landing light), and failure of Speedway Heliport personnel to: 1) conduct a safety briefing in advance of the race, 2) flight test temporary lighting to see whether any issues exist, and 3) require a single point entry and reporting point for approach to the heliport. --- Aircraft 4 The failure of both pilot's to maintain visual lookout resulting in the mid-air collision. A factor in the accident was the failure of the AS-350B pilot to follow approach procedures suggested in the Speedway Heliport Operations Manual. Findings in the investigation were the intentional operation of the EC 130 B4 helicopter by the pilot with known deficiencies in equipment (inoperative landing light), and failure of Speedway Heliport personnel to: 1) conduct safety briefing in advance of the race, 2) flight test temporary lighting to see whether any issues exist, and 3) require a single point entry and reporting point for approach to the heliport.

Both helicopters were on approach to the Speedway Heliport at night when they collided. The EC 130 B4 helicopter was on a long straight-in final flying eastbound, and the AS-350B helicopter was turning from right base onto final approach to the east. The AS-350 helicopter was slightly above and to the right of the EC 130 B4 helicopter; the main rotor blades of the EC 130 B4 helicopter contacted the left skid of the AS-350B helicopter. The EC 130 B4 helicopter descended vertically, while the AS-350B helicopter landed on grass at the heliport. Numerous witnesses saw external lights illuminated on both helicopters before the collision. The position lights and taxi light of the EC 130 B4 helicopter were on at the time of impact; the landing light was previously burned out. The position lights, strobe light, and search light of the AS-350B helicopter were reportedly on at the time of the collision. The individual providing VFR advisory service advised that before the collision, he observed the AS-350B helicopter, but never saw the EC 130 B4 helicopter. Both pilots had established two-way communication with the individual providing VFR advisory service on the unauthorized frequency being utilized, but the pilot of the EC 130 B4 helicopter reportedly did not provide a position report on the initial contact. The pilot of the AS-350B helicopter reportedly never heard communications from the pilot of the EC 130 B4 helicopter, and he did not see the other helicopter before the collision. Pyrotechnics occurred immediately before the collision in the area of the collision. Impact damage to the power supply of the upper strobe light for the EC 130 B4 helicopter precluded consistent operation during postaccident testing; the strobe light operationally tested satisfactory. The heliport operational procedures did not specify a single-point entry, nor reporting points, but did state that every effort shall be made to arrive via the east/west oriented canal that was located south of the heliport. Safety briefings suggested in Advisory Circular (AC) 00-61 were not conducted, nor was flight-testing to verify whether there were any issues related to installation of temporary lighting.

Aircraft 1 HISTORY OF FLIGHT On November 20, 2005, about 2048 eastern standard time, an Aerospatiale AS-350B (AS-350B) helicopter, N264BH, registered to and operated by Biscayne Helicopters, Inc., as a 14 CFR Part 91 positioning flight, and a Eurocopter France EC 130 B4 (EC 130 B4) helicopter, N130HS, registered to Wells Fargo Bank Northwest, and operated by HeliFlight, Inc., dba HelicopterShuttle.com, also as a 14 CFR Part 91 positioning flight, collided in-flight while both helicopters were on approach to land at Motorsports Complex VIP Heliport (Speedway Heliport), Homestead, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for either flight. Both helicopters were substantially damaged, and the commercial-rated pilot, the sole occupant of the AS-350B helicopter was not injured. The commercial-rated pilot, the sole occupant of the EC 130 B4 helicopter was fatally injured. The AS-350B flight originated about 2043, from Ocean Reef Club Airport, Key Largo, Florida. The EC 130 B4 flight originated about 2038, from Kendall-Tamiami Executive Airport (KTMB), Miami, Florida. A Ford 400 NASCAR Nextel Cup Series car race had previously ended at the Homestead-Miami Speedway. Both helicopters were in-bound to pick-up passengers at the Speedway Heliport. According to a Memorandum from the air traffic manager of KTMB Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT), at 2037:30, the pilot of the EC 130B4 helicopter contacted the facility on frequency 134.6 mHz and requested an "Echo" departure. The flight was cleared for takeoff and at 2039:31, the pilot requested frequency change to "Homestead Tower." According to a transcription of communications with Homestead Air Reserve Base (KHST) ATCT for the frequency 133.45 mHz, at 2039:55, the pilot of the EC 130B4 helicopter established contact and advised the controller that his flight was 6 miles to the north, and inbound for landing at the Speedway Heliport. The controller acknowledged that transmission and advised the pilot "Watch for two others inbound from the north" and also provided an altimeter setting. The pilot responded, "Oh I got him." At 2042:42, the pilot of the AS-350B helicopter contacted the KHST controller and advised that the flight was "off Ocean Reef back to the track." The controller advised the pilot to proceed, "Direct to the track" and provided the altimeter setting, which the pilot acknowledged. At 2043:42, the pilot of the EC 130 B4 requested frequency change to the track, to which the controller responded, "Yes sir, zero hotel sierra. Frequency change approved, thirty four three." The pilot correctly repeated the frequency. There were no further recorded transmissions from the pilot of the EC 130 B4 helicopter. At 2044:26, the controller advised the pilot of the AS-350B helicopter, "and uh six four bravo hotel, there is about four of them ahead of you. Contact track control." The pilot acknowledged that transmission. There were no further recorded transmissions from the pilot of the AS-350B helicopter. The AS-350B pilot stated that he contacted "race control" on frequency 134.3 mHz, and advised that he was 2 nautical miles southeast of the Speedway Heliport, inbound. He was advised to report when his flight was 1 mile south of the Speedway Heliport, which he complied with. He was advised to follow an Agusta 109 helicopter "to the pad." The Agusta 109 helicopter at the time of his radio call was located just north of the westernmost pad at the Speedway Heliport, and was in a 5-foot hover. He (AS-350B pilot) was on a modified right base for landing to the east at the Speedway Heliport, and turned onto final where, " shortly after that (I am not sure exactly how long) I felt a shudder and then the aircraft started to vibrate significantly (I do not remember my altitude or airspeed at that time)." He reported hearing the president of Biscayne Helicopters, Inc., advise over the frequency that there had been a midair collision. He performed a run-on landing on grass west of the helipads, and while the helicopter started to slow, it began turning and listing to the left. He braced when he saw the main rotor blades contacting the ground, and when they slowed, he executed the "emergency shutdown procedures." He then exited the helicopter from the right main cabin door. He further reported he does not recall hearing "a radio transmission from the other aircraft involved in the accident. Nor, do I remember seeing any aircraft in the landing pattern, except SK aircraft in the landing area." He also reported the nearby area was well lit, and he saw a lot of blinking lights from police cars that were located on a road that paralleled the canal south of the Speedway Heliport. At the time of the accident he had on the strobe lights, position lights, instrument lights, and search lights. The individual who was located at ground level at the Speedway Heliport and was handling ground-to-air communications at the time of the accident reported he had been on that position for approximately 45 minutes to 1 hour, and he was providing "VFR advisory service" to inbound helicopters. He was communicating with inbound and departing helicopters on frequency 134.3 mHz. The pilots of both helicopters announced on that frequency they were inbound to land at the Speedway Heliport. The pilot of the EC 130 B4 helicopter established contact with him 2 times, though he (the individual providing VFR advisory service) did not recall hearing the EC 130 B4 pilot provide a position report on initial contact. He (individual providing VFR advisory service) stated that he had visual contact with the AS-350B helicopter, but he never had visual contact by landing or strobe light with the EC 130 B4 helicopter, which was on a straight-in approach landing to the east. The AS-350B helicopter was assigned to the west side of the Speedway Heliport area, and the EC 130 B4 helicopter was assigned to the West pad, which was confirmed by the pilot. Approximately 2 minutes before the collision "tiny rockets" were launched from a nearby parking lot southwest of the Speedway Heliport. The individual providing VFR advisory service further reported he noticed the AS-350B helicopter was on a right base and noted an obscuration, which either could have been road dust, or smoke from the previously launched "tiny rockets." He didn't notice the obscuration until the collision; the AS-350B helicopter was in a right turn when the collision occurred. He did not see the EC 130 B4 helicopter until it was descending to the ground, nor did he recall seeing any lights from it. The sequence for landing was the AS-350B, followed by the EC 130 B4. His impression was that the EC 130 B4 helicopter was "farther away." When on an east operation, traffic will do a straight-in approach to the helipad; "long final approaches are normal." He also stated that he is able to see helicopters 2-3 deep lined up for final approach to the Speedway Heliport based on seeing landing lights. He was generally/typically looking for strobe or landing lights to visually observe inbound helicopters. At the time of the collision, he was only in contact with the pilots of the accident helicopters; there was no communication difficulty and he was not distracted by other duties. Additionally, helicopters were located on the east and center pads at the Heliport; both were preparing to depart. Numerous witnesses reported seeing the AS-350B helicopter, which was observed flying southwest of the Speedway Heliport, turn to the east. Simultaneously, the EC 130 B4 helicopter was flying in an easterly direction, and was located west of the Speedway Heliport. The witnesses reported the AS-350B helicopter was slightly higher and to the right of the EC 130 B4 helicopter, and the AS-350B helicopter appeared to be flying at a faster speed than the EC 130 B4 helicopter. One witness reported that the AS-350B helicopter wa --- Aircraft 4 HISTORY OF FLIGHT On November 20, 2005, about 2048 eastern standard time, an Aerospatiale AS-350B (AS-350B) helicopter, N264BH, registered to and operated by Biscayne Helicopters, Inc., as a 14 CFR Part 91 positioning flight, and a Eurocopter France EC 130 B4 (EC 130 B4) helicopter, N130HS, registered to Wells Fargo Bank Northwest, and operated by HeliFlight, Inc., dba HelicopterShuttle.com, also as a 14 CFR Part 91 positioning flight, collided in-flight while both helicopters were on approach to land at Motorsports Complex VIP Heliport (Speedway Heliport), Homestead, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for either flight. Both helicopters were substantially damaged, and the commercial-rated pilot, the sole occupant of the AS-350B helicopter was not injured. The commercial-rated pilot, the sole occupant of the EC 130 B4 helicopter was fatally injured. The AS-350B flight originated about 2043, from Ocean Reef Club Airport, Key Largo, Florida. The EC 130 B4 flight originated about 2038, from Kendall-Tamiami Executive Airport (KTMB), Miami, Florida. A Ford 400 NASCAR Nextel Cup Series car race had previously ended at the Homestead-Miami Speedway. Both helicopters were in-bound to pick-up passengers at the Speedway Heliport. According to a Memorandum from the air traffic manager of KTMB Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT), at 2037:30, the pilot of the EC 130B4 helicopter contacted the facility on frequency 134.6 mHz and requested an "Echo" departure. The flight was cleared for takeoff and at 2039:31, the pilot requested frequency change to "Homestead Tower." According to a transcription of communications with Homestead Air Reserve Base (KHST) ATCT for the frequency 133.45 mHz, at 2039:55, the pilot of the EC 130B4 helicopter established contact and advised the controller that his flight was 6 miles to the north, and inbound for landing at the Speedway Heliport. The controller acknowledged that transmission and advised the pilot "Watch for two others inbound from the north" and also provided an altimeter setting. The pilot responded, "Oh I got him." At 2042:42, the pilot of the AS-350B helicopter contacted the KHST controller and advised that the flight was "off Ocean Reef back to the track." The controller advised the pilot to proceed, "Direct to the track" and provided the altimeter setting, which the pilot acknowledged. At 2043:42, the pilot of the EC 130 B4 requested frequency change to the track, to which the controller responded, "Yes sir, zero hotel sierra. Frequency change approved, thirty four three." The pilot correctly repeated the frequency. There were no further recorded transmissions from the pilot of the EC 130 B4 helicopter. At 2044:26, the controller advised the pilot of the AS-350B helicopter, "and uh six four bravo hotel, there is about four of them ahead of you. Contact track control." The pilot acknowledged that transmission. There were no further recorded transmissions from the pilot of the AS-350B helicopter. The AS-350B pilot stated that he contacted "race control" on frequency 134.3 mHz, and advised that he was 2 nautical miles southeast of the Speedway Heliport, inbound. He was advised to report when his flight was 1 mile south of the Speedway Heliport, which he complied with. He was advised to follow an Agusta 109 helicopter "to the pad." The Agusta 109 helicopter at the time of his radio call was located just north of the westernmost pad at the Speedway Heliport, and was in a 5-foot hover. He (AS-350B pilot) was on a modified right base for landing to the east at the Speedway Heliport, and turned onto final where, "shortly after that (I am not sure exactly how long) I felt a shudder and then the aircraft started to vibrate significantly (I do not remember my altitude or airspeed at that time)." He reported hearing the president of Biscayne Helicopters, Inc., advise over the frequency that there had been a midair collision. He performed a run-on landing on grass west of the helipads, and while the helicopter started to slow, it began turning and listing to the left. He braced when he saw the main rotor blades contacting the ground, and when they slowed, he executed the "emergency shutdown procedures." He then exited the helicopter from the right main cabin door. He further reported he does not recall hearing "a radio transmission from the other aircraft involved in the accident. Nor, do I remember seeing any aircraft in the landing pattern, except SK aircraft in the landing area." He also reported the nearby area was well lit, and he saw a lot of blinking lights from police cars that were located on a road that paralleled the canal south of the Speedway Heliport. At the time of the accident he had on the strobe lights, position lights, instrument lights, and search lights. The individual who was located at ground level at the Speedway Heliport and was handling ground-to-air communications at the time of the accident reported he had been on that position for approximately 45 minutes to 1 hour, and he was providing "VFR advisory service" to inbound helicopters. He was communicating with inbound and departing helicopters on frequency 134.3 mHz. The pilots of both helicopters announced on that frequency they were inbound to land at the Speedway Heliport. The pilot of the EC 130 B4 helicopter established contact with him 2 times, though he (the individual providing VFR advisory service) did not recall hearing the EC 130 B4 pilot provide a position report on initial contact. He (individual providing VFR advisory service) stated that he had visual contact with the AS-350B helicopter, but he never had visual contact by landing or strobe light with the EC 130 B4 helicopter, which was on a straight-in approach landing to the east. The AS-350B helicopter was assigned to the west side of the Speedway Heliport area, and the EC 130 B4 helicopter was assigned to the West pad, which was confirmed by the pilot. Approximately 2 minutes before the collision "tiny rockets" were launched from a nearby parking lot southwest of the Speedway Heliport. The individual providing VFR advisory service further reported he noticed the AS-350B helicopter was on a right base and noted an obscuration, which either could have been road dust, or smoke from the previously launched "tiny rockets." He didn't notice the obscuration until the collision; the AS-350B helicopter was in a right turn when the collision occurred. He did not see the EC 130 B4 helicopter until it was descending to the ground, nor did he recall seeing any lights from it. The sequence for landing was the AS-350B, followed by the EC 130 B4. His impression was that the EC 130 B4 helicopter was "farther away." When on an east operation, traffic will do a straight-in approach to the helipad; "long final approaches are normal." He also stated that he is able to see helicopters 2-3 deep lined up for final approach to the Speedway Heliport based on seeing landing lights. He was generally/typically looking for strobe or landing lights to visually observe inbound helicopters. At the time of the collision, he was only in contact with the pilots of the accident helicopters; there was no communication difficulty and he was not distracted by other duties. Additionally, helicopters were located on the east and center pads at the Heliport; both were preparing to depart. Numerous witnesses reported seeing the AS-350B helicopter, which was observed flying southwest of the Speedway Heliport, turn to the east. Simultaneously, the EC 130 B4 helicopter was flying in an easterly direction, and was located west of the Speedway Heliport. The witnesses reported the AS-350B helicopter was slightly higher and to the right of the EC 130 B4 helicopter, and the AS-350B helicopter appeared to be flying at a faster speed than the EC 130 B4 helicopter. One witness reported that the AS-350B helicopter was