MIA07FA005

The failure of the flight crew to extend the landing gear. Contributing to the accident was the inoperative audible landing gear warning system.

As the flight approached Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International Airport, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, the flight crew prepared for a visual approach to the runway and advised the air traffic controller that the field was in sight. According to the pilot, he was distracted by trying to locate the runway for a visual approach. A review of the "Before Landing" and "Close In" checklists for the airplane revealed that both checklists contained landing gear verification tasks; however, although the copilot stated that he read from the checklist, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), which captured other cockpit conversations, recorded no checklist challenge-response callouts. During the landing, the airplane touched down on the runway with its landing gear retracted and slid about 2,600 feet before coming to a stop, sustaining substantial damage to a structural component and fire damage to the bottom of the fuselage. Following touchdown, the CVR recorded that the pilot asked what happened to the landing gear and that the copilot responded, "We never put it down." Although the airplane was equipped with an audible landing gear warning system designed to alert the flight crew that the landing gear is not extended when the airplane is otherwise configured for landing, the CVR captured no sounds that could be associated with the landing gear warning horn, and the pilot reported that he did not hear a warning. Postaccident testing of the airplane’s landing gear system revealed that it operated normally using the normal and emergency extension systems and that the cockpit landing gear visual annunciators and standby indicators correctly indicated the landing gear position. However, the audible landing gear warning system did not operate. Examination of the electrical wiring for the warning system revealed that a wire labeled "68CA8" was fractured and separated from the "CA" relay; this separation rendered the landing gear warning horn inoperative. Metallurgical examination of the 68CA8 wire revealed that the fracture features were consistent with overstress; however, the source of the overstress condition was not identified. According to the airplane’s maintenance records, the CA relay and its immediate area were inspected 7 months and 22 days before the accident, and the airplane had operated for 60 hours (accumulating 43 cycles) since the inspection. According to the airplane manufacturer, there is no preflight test that a flight crew could perform to determine the operational status of the audible landing gear warning system. However, because the audible landing gear warning system and the cabin altitude warning system shared the CA relay, the fractured 68CA8 wire would also have rendered the cabin altitude warning system inoperative, and the operational status of the cabin altitude warning system is a preflight check item for flight crews. Therefore, the anomaly that rendered the gear warning system inoperative would be detectable during a flight crew’s preflight check because the cabin altitude warning would fail to function. However, a review of available maintenance and discrepancy records revealed no indication that any flight crews had previously detected and reported an inoperative cabin altitude warning system, and the accident crewmembers provided no information about their preflight observations of the status of the cabin altitude warning system. Therefore, it could not be determined when the 68CA8 wire fracture occurred. The pilot was employed by the airplane’s owner. The investigation found that the pilot’s U.S. commercial airman certificate (issued on the basis of his Mexican pilot license) was not valid for the carriage of persons for compensation or hire. Further, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records indicated that the pilot did not hold a U.S. airman medical certificate and that his U.S. airman certificate did not include a type rating for the accident airplane or an instrument rating (the accident flight was operated under instrument flight rules). Additionally, the pilot had not completed a pilot proficiency check within the preceding 12 calendar months. Further, the copilot held only a U.S. private pilot certificate (issued on the basis of his Mexican pilot license) that did not include an instrument rating. Although there is insufficient evidence to indicate that any of these flight crew discrepancies were directly related to the cause of the accident, the FAA determined that these discrepancies represented noncompliance with numerous Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs). According to the FARs, the pilot was not authorized to act as pilot-in-command of the accident flight, and the copilot was not authorized to act as a required crewmember of the accident flight.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On November 1, 2006, about 0233 eastern standard time, a British Aerospace HS 125-700A, N232TN, registered to and operated by Juventude Ltd., was landed with the landing gear retracted at the Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International Airport (KFLL), Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 executive/corporate flight from Licenciado Adolfo Lopez Mateos International Airport (MMTO), Toluca, Mexico, to KFLL. The airplane was substantially damaged and there were no injuries to the commercial-rated pilot, private-rated co-pilot, or 10 passengers. The flight originated about 2235 central standard time from MMTO. The pilot-in-command (PIC) who was flying the airplane from the left seat reported that he began his day at 1100 CST, and flew 2 flights in a different airplane; the total flight duration for the 2 flights was approximately 3 hours. He did not rest between the 2 flights, then departed in the accident airplane and proceeded to KFLL. The airplane was "flying smooth", and when near KFLL, he became distracted in looking for the runway while executing a visual approach to runway 9L. The co-pilot read to himself from a "Flight Safety" checklist, but "not very loud", and there was no challenge response which was "...not typical for them." They "did not follow every item on the checklist", but the flaps were extended to 45 degrees for landing. In preparation for landing, he remembered placing his hand on the landing gear selector handle and moving it half way down, and later reported seeing a green light for the left main landing gear, but saw red lights for the nose and right main landing gears. He elected to continue the approach, and reduced the thrust levers to idle when the flight was approximately 1/4 mile from the runway. He did not hear an audible alarm at that time. The airplane was landed on runway 9L, and he thought he felt the tires rolling then applied the airbrake. He performed an emergency shutdown after the airplane came to rest on the runway, and all occupants exited the airplane. He (PIC) further reported that they did "many things wrong." The owner of the airplane who was a passenger reported that none of the flightcrew members advised them before landing to prepare for an emergency landing. Additionally, he went into the cockpit immediately after the airplane came to rest and noticed 2 red lights and a green light; the green light was associated with the left main landing gear. The remaining adult passengers stated they heard sounds during the landing then saw smoke. There was no mention that the flightcrew advised them to prepare for an emergency landing. According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) Factual Report, all inter-cockpit conversations were in Spanish, while conversations with air traffic control were in English. The audio quality of the communications recorded by the cockpit area microphone was reported to be good, which starts with the flight being cleared to descend to 10,000 feet, and ends with one of the flightcrew members advising the KFLL air traffic control tower (ATCT) that they were securing the airplane. No reading of a checklist was heard, and there was no sound associated with extension of the landing gear or landing gear warning horn during the entire recording. The summary transcription indicates that approximately 25 minutes 8 seconds into the CVR recording, a flightcrew member reported the field in sight. At 25 minutes 58 seconds into the CVR recording, the CVR recorded a discussion by the flightcrew about using full flaps for landing. At 27 minutes 57 seconds into the CVR recording, the CVR recorded a mechanical voice stating "five hundred" feet. The CVR then recorded the engine sound decreasing, and at 28 minutes 54 seconds into the CVR recording, a loud grinding sound started. The grinding sound continued for approximately 22 seconds, and stops at 29 minutes 16 seconds into the recording. The CVR then recorded a comment from the PIC asking what had happened to the landing gear. The CVR recorded the response from the co-pilot to be "we never put it down." The tower was then heard asking the flightcrew if they needed assistance, and one of the flightcrew members asked for assistance with moving the airplane off the runway. At 29 minutes 53 seconds into the CVR recording, the CVR recorded a cockpit conversation in which one of the passengers asks about the incident and the captain reported that the landing gear folded when he lowered the nose to the runway, and that the red light is on in the gear handle. At 32 minutes 39 seconds into the recording, the CVR recorded one of the flightcrew members advising the KFLL ATCT that they were going to secure the airplane. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The pilot-in-command (PIC) seated in the left seat was issued a FAA commercial pilot certificate with airplane single and multi-engine land ratings on December 17, 1990. The limitations of the certificate indicates, "issued on basis of and valid only when accompanied by Mexican pilot license number 1929. Not valid for the carriage of persons or property for compensation or hire or for agricultural aircraft operations." The PIC did not have a type rating for the accident airplane make and model, which is contrary to 14 CFR Part 61.31 (a)(2), nor did he have an instrument rating, which is contrary to 14 CFR Part 61.3(e((1), for operation of an airplane under IFR. There was no record of a U.S. issued medical certificate. The PIC's last flight proficiency check occurred in July 2005, in which he received 10 hours of training in the accident make and model airplane at Tornado Flight School, Mexico City, Mexico. FAA regulation 14 CFR Part 61.58(a)(1) requires a flight proficiency check each 12 calendar months. The co-pilot seated in the right seat was issued a FAA private pilot certificate with airplane single and multi-engine land ratings on January 5, 2006. The limitations of the certificate indicates, "issued on basis of and valid only when accompanied by Mexico pilot license number(s) 200302963. All limitations and restrictions on the Mexico pilot license apply." The co-pilot did not have an instrument rating on his private pilot certificate, which is contrary to 14 CFR Part 61.55(a)(2) for operation of an airplane under IFR. He was issued a U.S. first class medical certificate with no restrictions on April 10, 2006. The co-pilot on the accident flight replaced another pilot who was scheduled to perform the flight but became ill. Numerous requests were made by NTSB to the Mexican Government regarding Mexican pilot certificate information. The Mexican Government did not respond to the NTSB's requests. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The airplane was manufactured in 1978 by British Aerospace Aircraft Group, as model HS 125-700A, with modification number 258332. It was designated constructors reference number NA 0232, which correlates to serial number 257043. It was certificated in the transport category. The 10 passenger-seat airplane was equipped with retractable landing gears, and an audible landing gear warning which sounds when the flaps are in the landing position (45 degrees), the landing gear selector handle is in the up position, and one or both thrust levers are below the 60 percent rpm position. There is no direct functional test of the landing gear warning horn system that can be performed by the flightcrew before flight to determine the operational status of the landing gear warning horn; however, the cabin altitude warning system and the landing gear warning system share the same circuitry, including the CA relay and warning horn. The airplane "Crew Manual" is divided into 3 volumes, with the first being aircraft systems descriptions, the second being operating data, and the third being "Pilot's Checklists." NTSB review