MIA08FA026

The flight instructor’s failure to maintain control of the airplane while attempting to conduct visual flight in reduced visibility conditions at night. Factors contributing to the accident include the flight instructor’s inadequate preflight planning, and the impairment of both pilots due to fatigue.

Without obtaining a formal weather briefing or filing a flight plan, the certified flight instructor (CFI) and student pilot departed on a long night cross country instructional flight back to their home airport following a business meeting that was attended by the student pilot. Reported and forecast marginal visual flight rules (MVFR) conditions, and areas of instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), prevailed along their intended route of flight. This information would have been given to the CFI and/or student pilot if they would have requested a formal preflight weather briefing. Recorded radar data from the accident flight indicate that the airplane generally flew at an altitude that varied between 2,000 and 3,000 feet msl, which was consistent with an altitude that was intended to remain just below the reported scattered to broken layers of clouds along the route of flight. The flight path was along a nearly straight line to the destination airport. Due to radar coverage limitations, the radar data ended about 40 miles southeast of the accident site, when the airplane was flying about 2,200 feet msl, which was about 1,000 above the accident site elevation. A witness who lived in the vicinity of the crash site stated he heard the airplane fly over his home, with the engine sounding as if was operating at high power, followed by an impact sound. Examination of the crash site revealed that the airplane collided with trees and terrain in a steep nose-down attitude, and at a high velocity. The engine and forward portion of the airplane were embedded about four feet into the ground. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions with the airframe, engine, or systems. Analysis of the wreckage and surrounding terrain revealed impact damage signatures consistent with a loss of aircraft control while under engine power. The direction of the impact was nearly opposite the intended route of flight. The flaps and landing gear were retracted, consistent with a cruise flight configuration. The accident site was located in remote, hilly terrain with very few lights. The accident occurred in dark night conditions, and in reduced visibility from a low cloud ceiling and possible localized fog. The airplane likely entered instrument meteorological conditions, or conditions in which a horizon was not visible, which led to a failure of the CFI and/or student pilot to maintain level flight. It is possible that the loss of control was precipitated by spatial disorientation; however, due to a lack of recorded radar data or flight recorder data at the time of the accident, the investigation could not determine whether the pilots became spatially disoriented. Additionally, the investigation could not determine who was manipulating the controls at the time of the loss of control; however, the CFI was the pilot-in-command of the airplane. Review of the CFI and student pilot's chronological sleep patterns and duty day revealed that both pilots were susceptible to the effects of fatigue based on their sleep lengths during the 24 hours prior to the accident, and based on their time awake before the accident. Research has shown that human fatigue can degrade performance and judgment, and this likely impaired the performance and judgment of the CFI and student. [ This report was modified on January 26, 2010 ]

[ This factual report was modified on January 26, 2010 ] HISTORY OF FLIGHT On December 7, 2007, at 2117 central standard time (unless otherwise noted, all times are in central standard time based on a 24 hour clock) , a Cessna R182, N2643C, registered to Cherry Tree Aviation LLC and operated by Executive Flight Center, collided with trees and terrain during an uncontrolled descent near Woodland, Alabama. The instructional flight was conducted under visual flight rules (VFR), at night, under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. Marginal VFR conditions prevailed at the time of the accident, and no flight plan was filed. The certified flight instructor (CFI) and student pilot were fatally injured, and the airplane was destroyed. The flight originated from Orlando Executive Airport, Orlando, Florida at 1948 eastern standard time (est) Review of a transcript between the pilot and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Nashville Federal Contract Facility, Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) revealed that the CFI called the AFSS at 0147 and filed an instrument flight plan to fly from Alabama to Florida (the leg preceding the accident flight). The telephone call was terminated at 0150. The flight departed Madison County Executive/Tom Sharp Jr. Field at 0227 and arrived uneventfully at Orlando Executive Airport, Orlando, Florida, at 0645 est. According to the line supervisor at Shelt Air, a fixed based operator at the Orlando Executive Airport, the airplane was refueled with 61.2 gallons of 100 low lead aviation fuel after arrival. The CFI requested a courtesy car so she could take the student pilot to a hotel to attend a conference, and that she was going to get some rest after she returned. Both the CFI and the student pilot departed in the courtesy car, and the CFI returned at 0900 est. The line supervisor stated the CFI went to the crew room and appeared to be sleeping in a lounging chair with a blanket for about 2 to 4 hours. The line supervisor then observed the CFI eating pizza that was delivered to Shelt Air as a part of customer appreciation day at about 1230 est, and she also received a courtesy massage. The CFI asked if she could use the courtesy car later in the afternoon to pick up the student pilot. The courtesy car was not available, so the CFI rented a car at 1715 est. The rental car was returned about 1900 est. No record of a formal weather briefing, or a filed flight plan, for the accident flight back to Alabama was found. Recorded radar data from the accident flight was requested, obtained, and analyzed by the NTSB. Two radar data files were used. One was provided by the United States Air Force and contained target records from multiple radar sites in the eastern United States. The FAA supplied a second radar data file containing targets from Atlanta Terminal Radar Approach Control, obtained from a radar sensor located at Columbus, Georgia (CSG). Radar coverage collectively provided by these sites documented the flight path of the accident flight from departure until loss of data at 2105 (12 minutes before the accident). The radar coverage was virtually continuous, with no indication of erratic transponder operation. Data from radar sensors located at Marietta, Georgia; Haleyville, Alabama; and Montgomery, Alabama, were reviewed but provided no additional target information on the aircraft between loss of contact and the accident site. Altitude reports in the Air Force radar data file were uncorrected mode C reports (pressure altitude). The local altimeter setting at ORL was 30.28 in.Hg when N2643C departed. The altimeter setting at Valdosta, Georgia, at 2009 (approximately the time that N2643C passed southwest of the Valdosta Airport) was 30.29 in.Hg. The Anniston, Alabama 2100 altimeter setting was 30.23 in.Hg. As mode C altitude reports are quantified in 100-foot increments, these altimeter settings indicate that the pressure altitude reported by the aircraft during the flight would be increased 300 to 400 feet to convert pressure altitude to true altitude (based on the ORL altimeter setting). N2643C was operating under visual flight rules and did not receive any air traffic control (ATC) services after departure from ORL. The transcript of ATC communications with N2643C shows that the pilot was cleared for takeoff at 1948 est and directed to turn left northwest-bound after departure. At 2005 est, the tower controller instructed the pilot to set the aircraft’s transponder to code 1200. The pilot responded, “Sorry about that,” indicating that he may have forgotten to turn the transponder on when departing. There were no further radar-related exchanges between the pilot and ATC during the accident flight. Review of recorded data from an Air Force radar site located at Cape Canaveral, Florida shows an aircraft on code 1200 departing ORL at 2050 est and leaving the area to the northwest. There are no other aircraft with those characteristics leaving ORL at that time. The track proceeded northwest toward Gainesville, where the aircraft turned to the west and passed just west of the Gainesville Regional Airport class D airspace. The track then resumed a northwest heading, making another slight turn and passing just west of the Valdosta Regional Airport class D airspace. The aircraft turned toward the north and then back to the northwest, passing through the east side of the Benning Military Operations Area. The last target associated with N2643C was seen at 2105 by the CSG radar, approximately 40 nautical miles southeast of the accident site. The exact route flown from loss of contact to the accident site is unknown; however, the accident site was located along an extended line from the last radar contact. A witness who lived in the vicinity of the crash site stated he heard an airplane fly over his house between 2115 to 2130, with the power at a high rpm. A short time later, he heard an impact and immediately called the emergency 911 operators to report the accident. No eyewitnesses or other ear witnesses were identified during the investigation. Bethel East Volunteer Fire Department personnel located the wreckage at 2237. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The Certified Flight Instructor (CFI) The CFI, age 28, held an FAA commercial pilot certificate issued on December 18, 2003, with ratings for airplane single and multiengine land, and instrument airplane. She also held a flight instructor certificate issued on December 30, 2006, with ratings for airplane single and multiengine land, and instrument airplane. The CFI held an FAA first class medical certificate issued on February 26, 2007, with no restrictions. The CFI reported on her application for the medical certificate that she had accumulated 1,600 total flight hours. Review of her logbook revealed the flight time entries were not totaled, and numerous pages had yellow sticky notes with flight time entries. The last recorded entry in the logbook was on December 6, 2007. The CFI's last recorded night flight was on November 29, 2007, and she had logged 1.6 hours of night flight in the last 90 days. The CFI had flown 19.8 hours in the last 30 days, and 89.4 hours in the last 90 days. Her last flight review and total flight time in the Cessna R182 could not be determined. The CFI's last certified flight instructor renewal was conducted on December 30, 2006. The Student Pilot The student pilot, age 36, held a third class medical and a student pilot certificate issued on May 25, 2007, with no restrictions. The student pilot's logbook revealed his last recorded flight was on November 9, 2007. No flights were recorded in a Cessna R182. The student pilot had a total of 23.8 hours, of which 30 minutes were in the Cessna 172 and 23.3 hours were an American Champion. The pilot had flown 2.9 hours in the last 30 days and 8.2 hours in the last 90 days. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The