OPS10IA155

The air traffic controller's issuance of an improper takeoff clearance to the pilot of the Embraer. Contributing to the incident was the instructor’s inadequate monitoring of the trainee local controller.

An operational error occurred when an Embraer regional jet departing from runway 9R conflicted with a Raytheon-Beech King Air conducting a navigational flight check of equipment associated with runway 32. Both airplanes were receiving air traffic control services and were operating in Class B airspace. The control position handling the two airplanes was being operated by a trainee controller and an instructor. The trainee issued an improper takeoff clearance and departure heading to the regional jet that caused it to conflict with the King Air. The instructor did not notice the error and failed to intervene to prevent the loss of separation.

On April 21, 2010, at 2153 central daylight time, an operational error occurred at the Chicago O’Hare International Airport (ORD) Air Traffic Control Tower involving American Eagle flight 3962 (EGF3962), an EMB-135, and Flight Check 71 (FLC71), a KingAir 300. EGF3962 had just departed from runway 9R at ORD and was instructed to turn right to heading 140. FLC71 was operating under visual flight rules and inspecting the runway 32R instrument landing system. At the time of the incident, FLC71 was tracking the runway 32R localizer inbound to the airport at 2,200 feet. EGF3962 was operating under instrument flight rules on a scheduled 14 Code of Federal Regulations part 121 passenger flight to Little Rock, Arkansas. There was no damage reported to either aircraft, and no injuries to passengers or crew. EGF3962 was instructed to taxi into position and hold on runway 9R at 2151:02, and was cleared for takeoff at 2151:26. The pilot was instructed to fly heading 140 after departure. At 2152:51, there was a coordination call from Chicago TRACON to the North Local Controller position confirming that the North Local controllers were aware that FLC71 was inbound on the runway 32R final approach course. At 2153:14, the North Local controller transmitted a traffic advisory to EGF 3962, stating "Eagle 3962 traffic ahead and to the right is a King Air on a final for runway 32R he’s at 2200.” There was no response from the crew. At 2153:27, the North Local controller transmitted, “Eagle 3962?”, and the crew of EGF 3962 replied, "Yeah traffic’s in sight." At 2153:39, the North Local controller instructed EGF 3962 to turn right heading 180 and the crew acknowledged, stating “All right sir turn right to heading 180 Eagle 3962 we had a [traffic collision avoidance system -TCAS] resolution advisory.” The controller replied, “Thank you - that was a VFR King Air, Eagle 3962.” The crew responded,”…3962 we had him we were following an RA on the TCAS.” At 2154:02, the controller transmitted, "Eagle 3962 come back to heading of 140" and the crew acknowledged. At 2154:35, EGF3962 was instructed to contact departure. There was training in progress on the North Local position at the time of the incident. Radar Data Review of radar data showed that at closest point of approach, the two aircraft were 0.41nm apart laterally and 300 feet vertically. Following the incident, FLC71 continued inspection of the airport navigational aids and EGF3962 continued to Little Rock. Personnel Interviews North Local Trainee The controller being trained on the North Local position entered on duty with the FAA in September 2006 at Las Vegas, Nevada, was fully certified at Las Vegas, and transferred to O'Hare in February 2009. He was certified on the clearance delivery, flight data, ground metering, and inbound and outbound ground control positions. He stated that operations at the North Local position were normal, and he was having no trouble seeing aircraft from the control position. The trainee knew that FLC71 was going to be conducting operations on or near various runways around the airport, and that he was to protect for the operation. The instructions were to have aircraft departing runway 9R continue on a 090 heading when it was necessary to do so to avoid the flight check aircraft. An American Airlines flight departed runway 9R, and the trainee controller recalled that someone, probably his instructor, had told him that the American aircraft should be the last flight issued a 140 heading off the ground. EGF3962 was the next departure from runway 9R, and the trainee mistakenly also issued the pilot a 140 heading. The instructor was sitting next to him at the time, but apparently did not hear the incorrect heading being issued. The trainee stated that he was sure the instructor did not hear the clearance, because if he had he would have corrected it. The trainee could not specifically recall what the instructor was doing at the time, but said that the instructor may have been talking with another controller about FLC71. After EGF3962 took off, the aircraft turned to a 140 heading. The instructor noticed the turn, and asked the trainee where the aircraft was going. He then instructed the trainee to issue traffic advisories to the pilots. Their biggest concern at that point was for the two pilots to be aware of each other because of the impending conflict. The trainee stated that when issuing a takeoff clearance he normally scans the runway, then the ASDE-X display, and then the tower radar display. He did so when he issued departure clearance to EGF3962, but he overlooked FLC71 on the runway 32R final approach course even though there was a data tag on the aircraft's target. He said he checked the runway for traffic and checked the other "normal" conflict areas, but missed the traffic inbound to runway 32R, possibly because it was a "weird operation." The trainee stated that he first realized there was a problem when he saw EGF3962 off the departure end of the runway and beginning to turn. He stated that he and the instructor were "shaken up" after the event. The trainee did recognize that there had been a loss of separation and that the incident may have been an operational error. He left any discussions about the incident and the possible loss of separation up to his instructor. The trainee stated that he did not file an Air Traffic Safety Action Program (ATSAP) report because he did not believe it was necessary. However, he noted that if yet been certified on the position and it had been “...his ticket," he would have done so for protection. The trainee was uncertain whether there was a local requirement for controllers to report resolution advisories when they occur, but he believed that the management was required to report resolution advisories when they become aware of them. North Local Instructor The instructor entered on duty with the FAA in May 1989. He worked at St. Louis (STL) Flight Service, STL TRACON, Columbia tower, Meigs tower, and Midway tower before coming to ORD in 2000. He became fully certified in the tower in 2002. The instructor stated that the only unusual operational condition was the presence of the flight check aircraft around the airport. The supervisor on duty briefed the controllers that FLC71 would be following the localizer inbound to runway 32R, then breaking the approach off and heading east. The South Local controller and the East Arrival controller at the TRACON also passed along information about what FLC71 was planning to do. The instructor stated that the phone calls only verified what he had already been told by the supervisor. He was aware of FLC71’s position and what the general plan was. The instructor stated that he had instructed the trainee to discontinue the use of the 140 departure heading after the American Airlines flight took off. The trainee seemed to understand, and the instructor thought they had a common understanding of the traffic situation. The instructor then became occupied with coordination (possibly a phone call from the South Local controller relaying information from the approach control about FLC71) and did not hear the incorrect heading assignment. The instructor recalled that when EGF3962 lifted off, the aircraft turned right and ended up nose to nose with FLC71 inbound on the runway 32R localizer. The instructor told the trainee to issue traffic advisories to the pilots, and as the aircraft passed each other the instructor amended the 140 heading to heading 180 in order to increase the spacing between them. They had to issue the traffic advisories twice because the pilot of EGF3962 did not acknowledge the first call. The instructor stated that he saw the conflict out the window and noted that, "...it didn’t look as bad as it did on the radar." The instructor stated that when he detecte