SEA07LA152

The erroneous gross weight calculation and improper trim setting by the captain, which resulted in the airplane's failure to rotate at Vr as expected and the captain's decision to perform to a high speed aborted takeoff.

The captain supervised the fueling and the weight and balance computations, while the first officer filled out the takeoff and landing distance (TOLD) card; a center of gravity (CG) location was not computed. The first officer entered a takeoff gross weight of 45,400 pounds on the TOLD card, with the V-speeds for that weight entered on the card (V1 116 knots and Vr 129 knots). Post accident calculations revealed that the actual gross takeoff weight was 46,481 pounds and the CG was 15.73% of mean aerodynamic chord (MAC), which was within the maximum gross takeoff weight and center of gravity limits of 46,500 pounds and 14 to 31% MAC, respectively. The V-speeds for the actual gross weight are V1 118 knots and Vr 131 knots. The crew set the stabilizer trim at -5.5 degrees, which is in the takeoff range, from -4.5 degrees to -7.5 degrees. The -4.5 degree position is labeled "AFT" and is the right position for aft CG locations, while the -7.5 degree position is labeled "FWD" and is the right position for forward CG locations. For the airplane’s calculated CG of 15.73% MAC, the right setting for the stabilizer trim should have been between -7 and -7.5 degrees. The captain said that everything was normal in the takeoff. The first officer called V1, followed by Vr, at which time he pulled back on the yoke, but with no response. When the speed was well into the upper 130-knot range he relaxed the yoke, then pulled aft again, and again there was no response from the airplane. The captain aborted the takeoff and the airplane came to rest 580 feet off the end of the runway, after impacting a berm. A post accident inspection of the airplane revealed that all systems were operating within allowable tolerances. Post accident simulator testing revealed that when configured for takeoff in the accident conditions, stabilizer trim set to -5.5 degrees and V speeds set for 45,400 pounds, a delay of 2 to 4 seconds was noted from the time an up elevator input was made to the time the airplane reacted in pitch. When the simulator was configured with the stabilizer trim set to -7.0 degrees and the V speeds set for 46,480 pounds, there was no delay in airplane response to elevator input.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On June 10, 2007, about 1415 Pacific daylight time, N914DD, registered as a Dassault-Breguet Mystere Falcon 900, was substantially damaged when it overran the departure end of Runway 25 following an aborted take-off at the Santa Barbara Municipal Airport, Santa Barbara, California. The airplane was registered to Kerry Acquisitions LLC, of Concord, Massachusetts, and operated by Trishan Air, of Santa Barbara. The airline transport rated captain, airline transport rated pilot acting as first officer/co-pilot (FO), and 13 passengers were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 business flight, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed. The flight was originating at the time of the accident, and the intended destination was Tampa, Florida. In a statement submitted on June 11, 2007, and in a personal interview with a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Aviation Operations Safety Inspector, the captain reported that a normal preflight was conducted, and that the fuel load was brought up to 18,400 pounds for the [transcontinental] flight. The captain stated that the calculated weight of the aircraft was 45,400 pounds, with the following takeoff speeds being noted: takeoff decision speed (V1) - 116 knots, rotation speed (Vr) - 129 knots, and take-off safety speed (V2) - 154 knots. The captain further stated that based on the speeds previously noted, the balanced field length for a Runway 25 takeoff was 5,000 feet; according to the Airport Facility Directory, the length of Runway 25 is 6,055 feet. The captain reported that he did not perform a center of gravity (CG) computation. The captain revealed that all checklists were completed prior to reaching the runway, at which time the flight was cleared for takeoff. The captain reported that as power was applied normal acceleration was felt for a heavy weight takeoff, and all engine indications were normal. The captain stated that V1 speed was called, followed by Vr speed being called, at which time he pulled back on the yoke, but with no response. The captain further stated that when the speed was well into the upper 130 knot range he relaxed the yoke, then pulled aft again, and again there was no response from the airplane; "...it did not even try to lift off." The captain reported that with the end of the runway fast approaching he determined "...the odds of a possible airborne crash were greater than a runway/clearway type of incursion." The captain stated that power was then immediately reduced to the stops, full nose forward pressure was applied to the yoke, and maximum braking effort was applied. The captain further stated that because of the high speed minimal braking effectiveness, the airplane departed the end of Runway 25 just to the right of centerline, coming to a stop about 100 yards off the end of the runway into the dirt. In a statement submitted on June 11, 2007, the first officer reported that prior to taking off the captain supervised the fueling and the weight and balance, while he calculated and filled out the takeoff and landing distance card (TOLD card). The first officer further reported that after the engines were started, all checklists were completed prior to reaching Runway 25. The first officer stated that during the takeoff roll acceleration seemed normal, and that he called out "speed alive," "80 knots," "V1" and "Vr" speeds. "I then transitioned to the outside of the aircraft, expecting to see the aircraft lift off the ground. Shortly thereafter [the captain] called out something to the effect that nothing was happening. He then initiated the runway abort procedure, and that when it was apparent the airplane was not going to stop on the runway, the captain called out for everyone to brace themselves." The first officer stated that the airplane's nose gear sheared off when going over a berm, and that the airplane came to rest with its nose on the ground. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The Captain The captain, age 53, held an airline transport pilot certificate with a rating for airplane multi-engine land, and commercial privileges for airplane single-engine land. At the time of the accident the captain reported a total time of 14,000 hours, with 400 hours in make and model. The captain received his Dassault DA-50 type rating at the Flight Safety International Training Center, Teterboro, New Jersey, on June 24, 2006. The captain's most recent FAA first-class medical certificate was issued on February 1, 2007, with no limitations. The First Officer The first officer, age 66, held an airline transport pilot certificate with a rating for airplane multi-engine land, and commercial privileges for airplane single-engine land. At the time of the accident the first officer reported a total time of 15,000 hours, with 10 hours in make and model. The first officer received training in the DA-50 airplane from the accident captain in accordance with Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 61.55. The first officer's most recent FAA first-class medical certificate was issued on March 9, 2007, with the limitation "must wear corrective lenses." AIRCRAFT INFORMATIOIN The Dassault-Breguet Mystere Falcon 900, serial number 80, was issued an airworthiness certificate on January 9, 1990. The airplane was maintained in accordance with FAR Part 91.409 (f)(3) per the Dassault Falcon Jet recommended inspection program. The most recent inspection conducted prior to the accident was complied with on March 2, 2007, at a total airframe time of 5,473.1 hours. The airplane was equipped with three Garrett TFE 731-5BR turbofan engines, each rated at a maximum thrust of 4,750 pounds. The airplane was dispatched in accordance with the airplane's Minimum Equipment List (MEL) with the thrust reverser inoperative. The airplane was configured to carry 12 passengers and two pilots. According to the airplane’s type certificate data sheet, A46Eu, Revision 14, Mystere-Falcon 900, dated March 28, 2007, Crew Seats: The optional third crew seat may be occupied for takeoff and landing. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION At 1353, the weather reporting facility located at SBA reported wind 250 degrees at 8 knots, visibility 6 miles, haze, scattered clouds at 1,500 feet, scattered clouds at 20,000 feet, temperature 18 degrees C, dew point 12 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 29.89 inches of Mercury. FLIGHT RECORDERS The airplane was equipped with a Fairchild model A-100-A cockpit voice recorder (CVR). The CVR was secured and subsequently forwarded to the Safety Board's Recorder Laboratory in Washington, DC for evaluation. A transcript of the recording was prepared beginning at 13:51:27.9. The recording and transcript continued uninterrupted through the rejected takeoff and ended at 14:12:04.2. At 14:11:38.7, during the takeoff roll, the first officer called V1, and at 14:11:42.8 the first officer called Vr. At 14:11:51.8, 13.1 seconds after V1 was called by the first officer, the sound of decreasing engine RPM is heard. At 14:12:00.0 numerous impact sounds are heard, followed by the recorder ceasing to operate at 14:12:04.2. A flight data recorder (FDR) was not installed on the airplane, nor was it required to be per FAR 91.609(c). WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION A post-accident investigation of the accident site revealed that the airplane came to rest in an upright position 580 feet past the departure end of Runway 25, and about 15 feet to the right of the runway's extended centerline. After exiting the end of the runway the airplane impacted a berm, which resulted in the nose landing gear collapsing rearward and the airplane sliding on its nose before coming to a stop. Maintenance personnel who examined the airplane shortly after the occurrence reported substantial damage to the forward section of the pressure vessel, just aft of where the nose landing gear is attached; the