SEA08FA023

The pilot's failure to maintain an adequate terrain clearance/altitude during climb to cruise. Contributing to the accident were rising mountainous terrain, the dark nighttime lighting condition, the pilot's loss of situational awareness, and the Federal Aviation Administration controller's failure to issue a terrain-related safety alert.

"THIS CASE WAS MODIFIED JANUARY 27, 2009." The airplane collided with rising mountainous terrain during climb to cruise about 21 nm southwest of the departure airport. The accident occurred during dark night, visual meteorological conditions, about 13 minutes into the night cross-country flight. No lighted roads or round structures were present in the area to provide ground reference to terrain. 1% of the moons disk was illuminated. Over the last 6 minutes of the flight, recorded radar data indicated the airplane's average groundspeed was 100 knots and its average rate of climb was 406 fpm; an average rate of climb of 600 fpm was required to clear terrain along the flight path. An examination of the accident site indicated that the airplane impacted rapidly rising terrain in a near level flight attitude before descending and coming to rest in a rock outcropping. The resultant high-energy impact forces, coupled with the extensive thermal damage, destroyed the airplane. A postaccident examination of the airframe's structure and engine failed to reveal any preimpact failures or malfunctions. The airplane was equipped with a Garmin G1000 Integrated Cockpit System, which incorporates a multifunction color display that is capable of displaying terrain elevation information when selected to the Terrain Proximity page. Due to the extensive impact and thermal damage that the component had sustained, it was not possible to determine if the pilot was using the display to receive topographic data during the airplane's ascent. Records indicate that the pilot had received G1000 training. The Pilot's Guide for the G1000 states: "CAUTION: Use of Terrain Proximity information for primary terrain avoidance is prohibited. The Terrain Proximity Map is intended only to enhance situational awareness. It is the pilot's responsibility to provide terrain avoidance at all times." The flight was departing on a VFR flight plan and was receiving VFR flight following services from the Las Vegas Terminal Radar Approach Control facility. Air traffic control radar data revealed that the airplane was continuously visible to the controller on his radar display from the departure airport until impact with mountainous terrain. The airplane's course remained constant as he approached and impacted the mountain during the dark nighttime flight. The air traffic controller did not issue a terrain-related safety alert, as required by a Federal Aviation Administration order, because he did not observe a conflict with terrain.

"THIS CASE WAS MODIFIED JANUARY 27, 2009." HISTORY OF FLIGHT On November 8, 2007, about 1918 Pacific standard time, a Cessna T182T, N881CP, was destroyed after impacting mountainous terrain during climb to cruise near Potosi Mountain, about 13 nautical miles southwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. The airplane was registered to the Civil Air Patrol, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama. The left-seat first pilot and right-seat second pilot, both of whom possessed airline transport pilot certificates, were killed. Visual meteorological dark night conditions prevailed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal cross-country flight, and a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan had been filed and activated at the time of the accident. The flight departed the North Las Vegas Airport (VGT), Las Vegas, Nevada, about 1905, and was destined for the Rosamond Skypark (L00), Rosamond, California. At 1822 the pilot of N881CP filed a VFR flight plan from VGT to L00 and stated that he did not need a weather briefing. Air Traffic Control recorded the flight as CAP Flight 2793. The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) recorded data indicates that after departing VGT on Runway 30L, the airplane turned to a southwesterly heading. At 1905:29, the pilot made the following transmission: "Las Vegas departure, Cap Flight 2793 is with you. We're leaving, ah, twenty-seven hundred for ten point five." The controller responded, "Cap Flight twenty-seven ninety-three, Las Vegas departure. Ident, and ah, remain outside of class Bravo airspace." The pilot acknowledged the controller's instructions. At 1905:49, the controller transmitted, "Cap Flight twenty-seven ninety-three, radar contact two miles south of North Las Vegas Airport. Verify climbing two-thousand seven-hundred." The pilot responded, "That's affirmative." At 1906:05, the controller asked the pilot to verify his destination. The pilot replied, "We're going, ah, to Rosamond, California." The controller replied, "Cap Flight twenty-seven ninety-three, roger." At this time the airplane's altitude was 2,800 feet mean sea level (msl). At 1906:34, the controller advised the pilot, "Cap Flight twenty-seven ninety-three, traffic eleven o'clock, four miles west bound is a metro helicopter climbing three-thousand five-hundred." The pilot replied, "Twenty-seven ninety-three, we have him." The airplane's altitude was now 3,100 feet msl. At 1907:42, the pilot radioed to the controller, "And Cap Flight twenty-seven ninety-three, we would like to leave frequency for a minute to open a flight plan." The controller granted the pilot's request and asked him to confirm that he still had the helicopter in sight. The pilot replied, "That's affirmative." The controller replied, "Cap Flight, ah, twenty-seven ninety-three, roger. Maintain visual separation, and, ah, approved as requested." The pilot replied, "Alright." The airplane's altitude was 3,500 feet msl. At 1908:25 and 1908:40 the pilot attempted to contact Reno radio to open his flight plan; the flight service station (FSS) specialist reported that both transmissions were unintelligible. At this time the airplane's altitude was about 3,600 feet msl. At 1909:48 the pilot transmitted to Reno radio, "Flight two seven niner three departed North Las Vegas five minutes past the hour. Open my flight plan please." The FSS specialist replied, "Cap Flight two seven niner three, roger. VFR flight plan activated." The airplane was now at 4,100 feet msl. At 1910:30, the pilot asked the controller, "Can, ah, Cap Flight twenty-seven ninety-three get higher?" The airplane's altitude was now 4,200 feet msl. At 1910:33, the controller responded, "Cap Flight, ah, twenty-seven ninety-three contact approach one two, or correction, climb to VFR requested altitude outside of class Bravo airspace. Contact approach one two five point niner." The pilot replied, "Twenty-five nine, changing." The airplane's altitude was 4,200 feet msl. At 1910:50, the pilot transmitted to the controller, "Approach, Cap Flight twenty-seven ninety-three is with you. We're leaving forty-four hundred for ten point five." The controller replied, "And Cap Flight twenty-seven ninety-three, Las Vegas departure. Roger." The airplane's altitude was 4,400 feet msl. At 1911:55, the controller asked the pilot, "Cap Flight twenty-seven ninety-three, what's your requested on course heading, and how high you want to go?" The pilot responded, "We would like, ah, ten point five, and we are at two one zero." The airplane's altitude was 4,800 feet msl. At 1912:06, the controller responded, "Roger. Proceed on course. VFR climb to ten point five approved." The pilot replied, "Cap Flight twenty-seven ninety-three, thank you." The airplane's altitude was 4,900 feet msl. At 19:17:29 radar contact was lost. There was no further radio communication received from the flight. The last recorded altitude was 7,000 feet msl. A local law enforcement officer/pilot, who was assigned to the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department's Air Support/Search and Rescue Unit, reported that on the evening of the accident, while flying a helicopter patrol mission and heading in a south-southwest direction, he observed a large fireball/explosion in the vicinity of Mount Potosi, elevation 8,514 feet msl. The officer stated that his partner also observed and confirmed that it was an explosion. The officer reported that while en route to the area of the fire he observed additional fireballs, and upon arriving at the accident site his partner confirmed that the fire was the result of an airplane crash. One officer described the area as void of any lighting which would aid in the illumination of terrain. On November 10, 2007, onsite documentation of the accident site revealed that the airplane had impacted a near vertical rock face on the southeast side of Mount Potosi, about 1,000 feet below its summit. A survey of the accident site revealed that all airplane components necessary for flight were identified. One propeller blade was not accounted for during the initial onsite examination, nor during the recovery phase of the wreckage. On November 13, 2007, the airplane was recovered to a secured storage facility for further examination by parties to the investigation. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The First Pilot The left-seat first pilot, age 73, possessed an FAA airline transport pilot certificate for airplane multiengine land and commercial privileges for airplane single-engine land. The pilot also possessed multiple airline transport category type ratings, a turbojet flight engineer rating, as well as flight navigator certification. It was reported by Civil Air Patrol personnel that the pilot had accumulated a total flight time of 25,000 hours. The pilot's personal logbooks were not accounted for during the investigation. The pilot held a second-class FAA airman's medical certificate, which was issued on September 10, 2007, with the limitation "Must have available glasses for near vision." The pilot had been the CAP's Nevada Wing Commander since 2003. According to a flight log provided by the Nevada Wing of the CAP, the pilot had accumulated 74.7 hours in Garmin 1000 (G1000) equipped Cessna airplanes, and 34.2 hours in the accident airplane. The pilot had received G1000 training from a CAP instructor; the instructor was factory trained at the Cessna training facility in Independence, Missouri. The pilot's training was conducted in accordance with the Cessna FAA/Industry Training Standards (FITS) training program. The curriculum included 3 ground school sessions of 4 hours each, and three training flights of 2 hours each. The Second Pilot The right-seat second pilot, age 71, possessed an airline transport pilot certificate for airplane single-engine land, multiengine land, and single-engine sea. The pilot also held an airline transport pilot certificate for rotorcraft-helicopters