WPR12FA139

The pilot’s lack of situational awareness regarding the surrounding terrain while descending during dark night conditions, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain.

The pilot was delivering the single engine airplane from England to the west coast of the United States. According to his resume, he had piloted 196 Atlantic crossings in general aviation airplanes. The trip began about 1 week before the accident. The flights from England to Maine, with a pilot-rated passenger on board, consisted of 6 legs, with a total flight time of about 27 hours over a period of about 96 hours. The passenger and pilot separated in Bangor, Maine, and the pilot continued to Kentucky that same day, with an additional 2 legs and 6 hours flight time. He spent a total of 13 hours on the ground in Kentucky before departing early in the morning on the day of the accident. The first leg was 5 hours followed by a fuel stop. The next leg was 3 hours 20 minutes, and another fuel stop was made. The pilot then departed on the accident leg to his destination in California. The pilot flew the over 4-hour accident leg under visual flight rules using air traffic control flight following services. He flew directly between waypoints instead of on established airways. The airplane was equipped with a panel-mounted GPS unit with altitude information capability, and the pilot's iPad was equipped with current flight planning and guidance software, and electronic navigation charts. The pilot had access to sufficient information in flight to remain clear of terrain, but the investigation was unable to determine whether the pilot accessed that information during any part of that flight leg. When the airplane was about 65 miles from its destination, the pilot began a steady descent from his cruise altitude of 12,500 feet, which he had flown without supplemental oxygen. The destination elevation was 230 feet. Due to coverage limitations, radar contact with the airplane was lost when it was descending through 5,100 feet. At this point, the airplane was 46 miles from its destination, and the controller cancelled the flight-following services. There were no further communications from the pilot; up to this point, he had acknowledged all transmissions from ATC. Twelve miles after flight-following services were cancelled, the airplane impacted a hillside at an elevation of about 1,960 feet. Ground scar and wreckage information indicated that the airplane impacted in a wings-level attitude on a near-horizontal flight path. The airplane was highly fragmented and damaged by postimpact fire. Evidence was consistent with the landing gear and flaps retracted. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Darkness prevailed at the time of the accident, and AIRMETs for mountain obscuration were current for the time and location of the accident. Satellite and weather radar data suggested the presence of instrument meteorological conditions along parts of the airplane's route, but the investigation was unable to determine whether the pilot encountered or entered instrument meteorological conditions during the descent. Extrapolation of radar-derived speed and descent rate data indicated that the airplane descended steadily on track from cruise to the impact point. The pilot's autopsy indicated that the cause of death was multiple blunt trauma injuries, with no adverse pre-existing conditions. The effects of possible fatigue or hypoxia on the pilot's performance could not be determined.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On March 14, 2012, about 1955 Pacific daylight time (PDT), a Beech B36TC, N364AB, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain in the Diablo Mountain range near Panoche, California, during a delivery flight from Gloucester, England, to San Jose, California. The airplane was recently purchased and operated by Lafferty Aircraft Sales (LAS), and was operated by American King Air Services (AKAS). The pilot sustained fatal injuries. The accident leg of the flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91, and in accordance with visual flight rules (VFR). Darkness and possible instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and no Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) flight plan was filed for the flight. According to the pilot-rated passenger who flew with him for a portion of the trip, the pilot took a commercial flight from South Carolina to Florida on March 7, 2012, and the two of them then flew commercially to London, England, that evening. They arrived in London on March 8, and began the delivery flight the next day. They landed in Bangor, Maine, on March 13, where the passenger separated and returned to Florida via commercial airline service. The pilot continued with the delivery flight, and made an overnight stop in Kentucky that evening. The pilot departed Kentucky about 0900 local time on March 14, made one fuel stop in Oklahoma, and a second in Arizona. During the Arizona fuel stop, the pilot informed his wife that his planned overnight stop was at Hollister Municipal Airport (CVH), Hollister, California, and that the route for the last segment of that flight was direct from the Palmdale very high frequency omnirange facility (PMD VOR) to CVH. By the morning of March 15, neither the wife nor the pilot's business partner had heard from the pilot, and they began attempts to contact him. The FAA issued an Alert Notice (ALNOT) for the missing airplane later that morning. About 1200 PDT on March 17, the wreckage was found on a hillside, located on a ground track between PMD and CVH. The wreckage was located on a steep slope, was highly fragmented, and was damaged or consumed by fire. All major airplane components, or elements from them, were identified at the accident site. The wreckage was recovered to a secure facility for additional examination. The passenger stated that they did not experience any mechanical anomalies during his trans-Atlantic portion of the trip. While at the fuel stop in Arizona, the pilot told his wife that the airplane was performing "perfectly." PERSONNEL INFORMATION The pilot was the president of AKAS, located in South Carolina. According to its website, one service provided by AKAS was the transport/delivery of airplanes over long distances. The pilot was transporting the airplane for LAS of San Jose, California. Records provided by the FAA and LAS indicated that the pilot held multiple certificates and ratings, including an Airline Transport Pilot certificate. The 78-year-old pilot reported a total flight experience of about 13,400 hours, including about 300 hours in Beech 35/36 airplanes. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued in October 2011. The pilot's resume reported that he had 196 Atlantic crossings in general aviation aircraft. According to persons knowledgeable about the pilot's flying habits, whenever possible, although he was instrument rated and current, the pilot preferred to fly under VFR, and via direct routes using GPS. Witness and tracking data from the flight indicated that the pilot's behavior and actions were consistent with his reported preferences. Details regarding the pilot's wake/sleep cycles and quality of sleep during the trip were not available. In September 2007, based on a telephone call from an unidentified woman, the FAA began an investigation into the pilot's fitness to hold a second-class medical certificate. The caller claimed that the pilot had significant vision and hearing deficiencies. In spring 2007, the FAA determined that the pilot remained qualified to hold that certificate, and the available evidence indicated that the complainant was the pilot's ex-wife. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The airplane was manufactured in 1991, and was equipped with a Continental Motors TSIO-520 series engine. The most recent annual inspection was completed in England on March 9, 2012. The maintenance records indicated that at the time of that inspection, the airframe, engine, and propeller each had a total time in service of 1,302 hours. The records also indicated that about 20 discrepancies that were noted by the inspecting technicians were dispositioned as "owner requests no action," and therefore no corrective actions for those items were accomplished. The airplane was equipped, approved, and current for instrument flight rules (IFR) operations. In addition to the normal complement of avionics, the airplane was equipped with an autopilot and a King KLN-90B IFR certified GPS navigation system. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION On the day of the accident, accident locale sunset occurred at 1913, and local civil twilight ended at 1938. The moon did not rise until 0144 the next morning. AIRMETs for icing, IFR conditions, and mountain obscuration were current for the accident locale and flight altitudes. The investigation was unable to determine whether the pilot was aware of those AIRMETs. METARs from surrounding airports about the time of the accident were as follows: CVH (leg destination; ~34 nm northwest of accident, elevation 230 ft) 1945 PDT Wind 290 degrees at 7 knots, visibility 10 miles, few clouds at 1,400 ft agl, overcast at 3,000 ft agl, temperature 14 degrees C, dew point 12 degrees C 2005 PDT Wind 300 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 10 miles, overcast at 3,000 ft agl, temperature 14 degrees C, dew point 12 degrees C SJC (San Jose, ultimate destination; ~72 nm northwest of accident, elevation 62 ft) 1953 PDT Wind 100 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 10 miles, light rain, few clouds at 1,500 ft agl, scattered clouds at 3,000 ft agl, overcast at 6,500 ft agl, temperature 14 degrees C, dew point 12 degrees C SNS (Salinas, ~38 nm west northwest of accident, elevation 85 ft) 1953 PDT Wind 340 degrees at 6 knots, visibility 10 miles, light rain, overcast at 6,500 ft agl, temperature 16 degrees C, dew point 12 degrees C NLC (LeMoore, ~45 east southeast nm west northwest of accident, elevation 232 ft) 1956 PDT Wind 350 degrees at 8 knots, visibility 10 miles, scattered clouds at 6,500 ft agl, overcast at 15,000 ft agl , temperature 18 degrees C, dew point 8 degrees C Rawinsonde data (information derived from an instrument package ascending through the atmosphere) identified a saturated or near-saturated environment between about 3,300 and 8,200 feet mean sea level (msl). A cross-section of that data identified an extensive area of relative humidity values greater than 94 percent between near-surface altitudes and approximately 4,300 feet msl. Satellite imagery indicated that cloudy conditions dominated much of the accident region, but a layer of high clouds prevented determination of whether clouds were present along the airplane's flight path or at the flight elevations near the accident site. Doppler weather radar imagery did not indicate significant meteorological targets above the accident location between altitudes of 3,100 and 9,100 feet msl.AIDS TO NAVIGATION According to the pilot's business partner, the pilot wanted to ensure that the database in the KLN 90B GPS unit was updated for the United States before he began the flight, and the partner understood that that update had been accomplished. According to a representative of the manufacturer of the KLN 90B, the device includes altitude features such as Minimum Safe Altitudes, Minimum En route Altitudes and altitude alerting. The pilot also had a personal iPad with the "Fore