WPR14FA195

The pilot’s decision to exit the helicopter while it was running and his failure to properly secure the flight controls with the engine operating at flight idle before exiting the helicopter.

The commercial pilot was repositioning the helicopter and advised ground personnel that he intended to land and perform a "fluid check." Company personnel reported that most pilots used this term when they intended to land away from the awaiting passengers and exit the helicopter to relieve themselves. The pilots would generally leave the engine running when outside the helicopter. The helicopter was equipped with an on board video recording system. The recording revealed that the pilot landed the helicopter in a location that had a direct buffeting crosswind. The pilot tightened the friction on the cyclic, which then did not move. The twist grip light illuminated, and engine audio was consistent with the throttle being moved toward ground idle. About 6 seconds later, the twist grip light extinguished, engine audio was consistent with an increase in power to flight idle; engine data parameters indicate that the twist grip was moved to flight idle. On the video, the collective position continued to increase. About 15 seconds later, the pilot exited the helicopter. External audio indicated a sound similar to N1 increasing. For the next 24 seconds, the video showed an increase in airframe buffeting. The helicopter then began to pitch nose down. One second later, the helicopter began to roll right; the roll increased, and the helicopter then began to yaw left. The sound of the door opening was heard, likely indicating that the pilot attempted to enter the helicopter. The helicopter continued to roll and yaw until noises consistent with the rotor blades impacting the ground were heard. The operator had a policy that required a pilot to always be at the controls of a running helicopter. However, according to pilot interviews, this policy was not generally followed, and the pilots would not shut down the helicopter when they needed to relieve themselves. However, pilots who were interviewed stated that they would leave the helicopter operating at ground idle. It could not be determined why the pilot would leave the helicopter while it was operating at flight idle without the flight controls properly secured.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On May 18, 2014, about 1600 mountain standard time (MST), an American Eurocopter Corp, AS350B3E, N840PA, rolled over after landing at the Ramada landing site located at the bottom of the Grand Canyon near Grand Canyon West Airport (1G4), Peach Springs, Arizona. Papillon Airways Inc., DBA Grand Canyon Helicopters, was operating the helicopter under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. The commercial pilot with a flight instructor (FI) certificate was fatally injured; the helicopter sustained substantial damage. The local repositioning flight departed 1G4 about 1555. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a company flight plan had been filed. The accident site was 1.75 nm east of 1G4, located at the bottom of the Grand Canyon, approximately 380 feet west of the Colorado River (west shore). The wreckage was found resting on its right side located at the subject landing pad. Witnesses reported that the pilot reported over the radio that he was inbound to land, and was planning on exiting the helicopter to perform a "fluid level check." After landing, the pilot exited the running helicopter; the helicopter was observed going airborne and then impacting the ground and rolling over. The pilot was struck by one or more of the main rotor blades, and was fatally injured. The helicopter was examined on site by the investigation team. No abnormalities with the helicopter's airframe or engine systems were noted. The helicopter was recovered for further examination. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The operator reported that the 26-year old pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for rotorcraft and instrument rotorcraft. The pilot held a flight instructor certificate with ratings for rotorcraft and instrument rotorcraft. The pilot held a first-class medical certificate issued on June 12, 2013. It had no limitations or waivers. The operator reported that the pilot had a total flight time of 2,125.3 hours. He logged 195.3 hours in the last 90 days, and 79.6 in the last 30 days. He had an estimated 142.5 hours in this make and model. He completed a FAR 135 proficiency flight check on April 17, 2014. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION The helicopter was an American Eurocopter AS350B3, serial number 7718. The helicopter's Hobbs meter indicated a total airframe time of 102.8 hours since new. The starting Hobbs for the day of the accident was 97.1 hours. The pilot had flown a total of 5.7 hours on the day of the accident. The helicopter was first registered as new by the operator in January 2014. The helicopter was equipped with an Appareo Vision 1000 cockpit imaging and flight data monitoring device. The Appareo device was undamaged, and sent to the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Laboratory in Washington, DC for data extraction. The helicopter was equipped with a 406-mhz Emergency Location Transmitter (ELT). The Armed Forces Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) received the ELT activation at 2300z (1600 hours MST.) The first activation did not have any latitude or longitude information. However, the second activation was received at 2329z, which was 29 minutes after the accident with lat/lon data that was 1,500 yards north of the accident site. The ELT did not assist in locating the accident site due to prior reporting by on scene witnesses. COCKPIT IMAGE DATA RECORDER The complete factual report of investigation for the onboard image recorder is attached to the docket for this accident. The Appareo Vision 1000 device is a small self-contained image, audio, and data recorder. The unit is typically mounted in the overhead of an aircraft's cockpit, and records a cockpit image at a rate of four times per second. In addition to cockpit images, the device is also capable of recording two tracks of audio that are synchronized with the image data. The unit also contains a GPS receiver that receives GPS satellite based aircraft time, position, altitude, and speed. In addition to the GPS position, the Appareo unit also has a self-contained real-time inertial measuring unit that provides 3-axis accelerations as well as aircraft pitch, roll, and yaw data. Track one of the Appareo Vision 1000 recorder is available to be connected to an external audio source such as the aircraft's intercom or radios. Track two records audio picked up by a microphone mounted internal to the Vision 1000 unit. In this installation, no external audio was connected to track one, and the track two microphone only picked up very loud engine/transmission sounds from the helicopter. The Appareo unit records the image, audio, and parametric data on a removable SD memory card that is inserted into the unit. This removable memory retains approximately the last 2 hours of image and audio data, and about the last 100 hours of parametric data. In addition to the removable memory, the Vision 1000 is also equipped with a crash and fire resistant memory module that is mounted internal to the unit. This internal memory contains an exact duplicate of the data stored on the removable card. The Appareo unit on this helicopter was connected to its battery through the master battery switch. Anytime the battery switch was turned on, the Appareo unit started to record audio, images, and data. The Vision 1000 unit created a new file for every electrical power application. Some of the recorded files were flights, and some of the files were just short power cycles of the helicopter's battery. The accident recording captured the helicopter operating in a circular route between 1G4 and an alternate helipad operated by Papillon Airways. The rotorcraft flew a circular pattern between the two landing zones either ferrying passengers or company employees between the two areas. The recording captured 16.5 complete laps of the circular pattern, and included 36 landings. Additionally, an event similar to the accident portion of the flight was discovered on the audio/video recording, and was summarized in section 5.2 of the docket report. This event occurred around 14:26:28.76 MST, and began with the rotorcraft touching down at the alternate landing zone near the rafting facility. The previous event that was captured by the Appareo Vision 1000 device that occurred approximately 1.5 hours prior to the accident event was reviewed by the video group. This event was captured in the same flight file that contained the accident. It was chosen that this portion of the flight be closely reviewed as it captured the only other time on the recording when the accident pilot exited the cockpit of the rotorcraft while the rotorcraft was running. This event began at 3:08:44.51 video elapsed time, and the instrument mounted analog clock read 14:30:20 MST when the pilot touched down at the LVH Pad in the same direction and orientation as the accident portion. All engine operating parameters appeared normal and consistent with the rotorcraft operating in flight idle. No caution or warning lights appeared illuminated on the caution/warning panel. The air conditioning compressor operation status lights were illuminated indicating that the compressor was operating. The yaw yarn was noted moving on the windscreen in the same manner as during the accident portion of the recording. The significant differences noted by the group between this particular event and the accident event were as follows: • The rotorcraft remained at flight idle during the entire duration in which the rotorcraft was on the pad. • The pilot did not reach for or manipulate the horn switch. • No changes in Engine Generator Speed (N1) ambient audio or related helicopter instrumentation were noted during the time the rotorcraft was on the ground. • Sounds were consistent with a forward door opening and remaining open during the time the pilot was outside the view of the camera. No significant buffe