WPR14FA393

The pilot's failure to maintain airspeed during initial climb, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical angle of attack and experiencing an aerodynamic stall. Contributing to the accident was the inability of the flight instructor to take control of the airplane due to the lack of fully operational dual controls in the right-seat pilot position.

The pilot/owner had recently purchased the tailwheel-equipped airplane. He had no experience in tailwheel-equipped airplanes and asked a flight instructor to check him out. The instructor stated that, although he was an experienced tailwheel pilot, he had no experience in the accident airplane make and model, so he flew the airplane solo for about 5 hours in order to become familiar with it. The instructor reported that while flying the airplane solo, he noticed that it would become airborne prematurely if he did not hold the control stick full forward on the takeoff run to keep the airplane on the runway while trying to gain airspeed. The instructor added that he told the pilot/owner about this and cautioned him to hold the control stick full forward on takeoff to prevent the airplane from becoming airborne inadvertently. During the accident flight, the pilot/owner was in the left seat, and the instructor was in the right seat; the right-seat pilot position was equipped with rudder pedals but not with a control stick. The instructor stated that, during the takeoff run, the airplane became airborne prematurely because the pilot/owner failed to hold the control stick full forward as previously instructed. The instructor reported that he told the pilot/owner to lower the nose after the airplane became airborne and also tried to reach over to move the control stick forward to get the nose down but was not successful because the pilot/owner had frozen on the controls. The airplane subsequently stalled due to the loss of sufficient airspeed and impacted the ground about 225 feet east of the runway in a steep, nose-down attitude. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no anomalies that would have preclude normal operation.

Under the supervision of the NTSB IIC, the engine was examined by a Rotax Aircraft Engines field representative on December 8, 2014. As a result of the examination, the field representative concluded that no anomalies or defects were observed during the examination of the engine and its components that would have precluded normal operation. (Refer to the Rotax Aircraft Engines Investigation Report, which is appended to the docket for this report.) The Code of Federal Regulations, 14 CFR 91.109 states in part, "No person may operate a civil aircraft.....that is being used for flight instruction unless that aircraft has fully functioning dual controls..." Stall and Spin Awareness Training – AC 61-67C According to the Advisory Circular, "Although the distribution of weight has the most direct effect on stability, increased gross weight can also have an effect on an aircraft's flight characteristics, regardless of the CG position. As the weight of the airplane is increased, the stall speed increases. The increased weight requires a higher AOA to produce additional lift to support the weight." An autopsy of the pilot/owner receiving instruction was performed on September 29, 2014, at the facilities of the Snohomish Medical Examiner's Office, Everett, Washington. The results of the autopsy revealed that the cause of death was attributed to "blunt force trauma." Forensic toxicology was performed on specimens from the pilot receiving instruction by the FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute. The toxicology report stated: NO CARBON MONOXIDE detected in Blood (Cavity); testing for Cyanide NOT PERFORMED; NO ETHANOL detected in Blood (Cavity); Torsemide detected in Blood (Cavity); Warfarin detected in Blood (Cavity); Warfarin detected in liver. Torsenmide is a diuretic used to reduce high blood pressure. Warfarin is a blood thinner used to reduce the formation of blood clots. A survey of the accident site by the National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge revealed that the airplane impacted terrain about 2,925 feet from where it would have initiated its takeoff roll on Runway 34, and about 225 feet east of the runway. The airplane came to rest on its nose and left wing in a clearing surrounded by medium sized bushes and trees, with the fuselage oriented tail up at about a 45-degree angle; the at rest heading was measured at 243 degrees magnetic. All flight components necessary for flight were accounted for at the accident site. First responders to the accident site reported that fuel was dripping, not flowing, from the airplane's left wing fuel tank, which was breached due to impact damage. The cabin/cockpit, engine, left wing, and aft fuselage areas sustained substantial damage. The right wing remained intact and connected to the wing root at all attach points. The only discernable damage to the wing was some wrinkling on its upper surface. The right flaperon remained attached to the wing's trailing edge at all attach points. Control continuity was established from the flaperon to the left-seat pilot's control position. The wing's fuel tank remained intact, with the fuel cap in place and tight to movement. The left wing remained attached to the wing root at all attach points. Additionally, the wing was observed to have sustained substantial impact damage, with significant deformation through its entire span. The flaperon was also observed to have remained attached to the wing's trailing edge at all attach points, but with only minimal damage. Control continuity was confirmed from the flaperon to the left-seat pilot's control position. The wing's fuel tank was observed to have been breached due to impact forces, with the fuel cap in place and tight to movement. The aft fuselage, about midway back from the aft cabin bulkhead, was observed bent and twisted. The empennage, inclusive of the vertical stabilizer, both left and right horizontal stabilizers, rudder, and both left and right elevators were intact and remained connected at all attach points. No discernable damage was observed. Flight control continuity was established from the rudder and elevator forward to the cockpit control area. The engine was observed to have remained attached to its mount but was substantially damaged due to impact forces. Two of the three propeller blades had separated from the propeller hub, with one blade still attached. The examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. At 1535, the weather reporting facility at the Arlington Airport (AWO), located about 5 nautical miles northwest of the accident site, reported wind 310 at 11 knots, gusts to 16 knots, visibility 10 miles, sky clear, temperature 17 degrees C, dew point 13 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 30.11 inches of mercury. The airplane, a Tifft Kitfox III, serial number 1040, was a high-wing, tailwheel equipped airplane, powered by a 65 horsepower Rotax 582 MOD 90 engine. The Federal Aviation Administration experimental amateur-built airworthiness certificate was issued for the airplane on December 9, 1994. The last condition inspection was performed on June 1, 2014, at a total airframe time of 138 hours. The airplane had flown 5.0 hours since the inspection. The airplane was not equipped with a full set of dual controls, in that the left seat pilot position had a control stick and rudder pedals, while the right seat pilot position was equipped with rudder pedals only. On September 27, 2014, about 1535 Pacific daylight time, an amateur-built experimental Tifft Kitfox III, N307KF, collided with the terrain following a loss of control during takeoff initial climb at the Frontier Airpark (WN53), Lake Stevens, Washington. The left seat pilot, who was receiving instruction, sustained fatal injuries, and the right seat certified flight instructor (CFI) sustained serious injuries. The airplane was registered to and operated by the pilot receiving instruction as a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 instructional flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the proposed local flight, and no flight plan was filed. The flight was originating at the time of the accident. In a written report submitted to the National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge (IIC), the CFI reported that the pilot/owner receiving instruction had recently purchased the airplane, and lacking any conventional gear (tailwheel) experience, asked the CFI to check him out in the airplane. The CFI further reported that prior to the accident flight, he personally flew the airplane solo from the left seat to get a feel for the airplane, during which time he observed that the airplane had an inherent characteristic of pitching up and lifting off inadvertently, which required the pilot to hold full forward stick prior to the planned lift-off. The CFI stated that the airplane was not equipped with a full set of dual controls; the left seat pilot had access to a control stick and rudder pedals, while the right seat pilot position was equipped with rudder pedals only, and no control stick. The CFI further stated that prior to the day of the accident he provided the pilot/owner with taxi instruction in order for him to learn how to taxi a conventional gear airplane; the pilot owner occupied the left pilot seat where the sole set of flight controls was located. Additionally, the instructor cautioned the pilot/owner about the nose-up characteristic the airplane possessed on initial takeoff roll, to be aware of this tendency, and to keep the nose down on the takeoff roll until the desired airspeed was obtained. The CFI reported that on the day of the accident flight, his intention was to have the pilot/owner practice handling procedures on the runway, by adding takeoff power, getting the tail up and into the two-point position on the main landing gear while holding the control stick full forward