WPR17FA041

The pilot's abnormally steep takeoff climb followed by a loss of control and rapid descent to ground impact, for undetermined reasons.

The private pilot began flight training in 1996 and had accrued about 187 total hours of flight experience by 2012, mostly in low-performance Cessna and Piper airplanes. The pilot then ceased flying until mid-2016, when he purchased the previously-owned experimental amateur-built, high-performance accident airplane. In late 2016, when he had accrued about 31 hours of flight experience in the airplane, the pilot and a non-pilot rated passenger departed for a local personal flight. Weather conditions were benign, with light winds, clear skies, and moderate temperature. According to multiple witnesses, some of whom were pilots, the airplane entered a steep climb at some point after it lifted off.  The airplane then began a sharp right turn while continuing to climb rapidly. Shortly thereafter, the airplane entered a steep descent and impacted marshy terrain about 900 ft to the northeast of the departure end of the runway. A flight path reconstructed from data recovered from an onboard GPS device indicated a trajectory that was similar to that indicated by the witness accounts. GPS-derived comparison of the profile of the accident takeoff with those of seven of the pilot's other takeoffs in the airplane from the accident airport revealed that five of the other seven takeoff profiles were similar to one another, and that the accident takeoff profile was markedly different from those five. During the accident takeoff, the airplane remained on or near the ground about 25 seconds longer than it did during those five other takeoffs, and then climbed at a rate that was about twice the rates of those five takeoffs. The other two takeoffs exhibited ground or near-ground travel durations of about 40 seconds, with climb rates similar to those of the other five takeoffs. Postaccident examination of the engine and airframe did not reveal evidence of any pre-impact mechanical deficiencies or failures that would have precluded normal operation, and the damage was consistent with the engine developing at least moderate power at impact. The airplane was equipped with dual flight controls, but the investigation was unable to determine who was manipulating the controls for the takeoff and flight. The relative sizes of the two occupants were not consistent with the passenger being able to overpower the pilot on the flight controls. The takeoff profile was consistent with an aggressive, more exciting technique sometimes referred to as a "high-performance" or "zoom climb" takeoff. The investigation was unable to determine the reason for this takeoff profile that was uncharacteristic from previous departures. The investigation was also unable to determine the reason(s) for the right turn/roll and departure from controlled flight.

The airport was not equipped with any weather sensing, reporting, or recording equipment. The 1315 automated weather observation at Fresno Chandler Executive Airport (FCH), located 8 miles south of E79, included visibility 10 miles, clear skies, temperature 10°C, dew point 3°C, and an altimeter setting of 30.28 inches of mercury. The observation did not include any wind data. Meteorological conditions at Fresno-Yosemite Air Terminal (FAT), located 8 miles southeast of E79, were similar and included winds from 310° at 5 knots. Pilot The 47-year-old pilot held a private pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating. His most recent Federal Aviation Administration third-class medical certificate was issued in July 2016. According to the pilot's logbook, he began flight training in 1996 and received his pilot certificate in 1997. He accrued about 150 hours total in several airplane types, including Cessna 150, Cessna 172, Piper PA-38, and Piper PA-28R models. In 2002 and 2004, he accrued about 24 and 2 hours, respectively, in a Velocity experimental amateur-built airplane. He then stopped flying until 2011. In 2011 and 2012, he flew about 13 hours in a Piper PA-28 airplane. In August 2016, when he had a total flight experience of about 187 hours, the pilot bought and logged his first flight in the accident airplane make and model, which was the accident airplane. Excluding the accident flight, he had logged a total of 31.1 hours in that airplane. The pilot's total flight experience at the time of the accident was about 218 hours. A former neighbor of the accident pilot, who was also a pilot and had previously built an Express S-90 in which he had accumulated about 150 flight hours, reported that he had flown the accident airplane several times with the accident pilot, most recently about 5 days before the accident. The former neighbor stated that he knew the pilot well and firmly believed that the pilot would not try to "show off," scare passengers, or do "high performance takeoffs," which he explained were takeoffs in which the airplane climbed away from the runway at an unusually steep angle. Another resident stated that he thought the accident pilot was a "good pilot" but added that the pilot was "behind the airplane." He did not elaborate on either his opinion or its basis. Passenger The passenger was a 32-year-old male. He was the son of a neighbor of the pilot. He did not hold any FAA certificates. According to family members, he had no piloting experience and no plans to learn to fly, and the accident flight was one of his very few flights in a general aviation airplane. The fixed-gear, four-place, high-performance airplane was designed and marketed by Composite Aircraft Technology. The airplane was built by a third party in 2004 and was owned by several different persons before it was purchased by the accident pilot. The airplane was equipped with a Lycoming IO-540 series engine and a Hartzell 3-blade propeller. According to the maintenance records, the most recent condition inspection was completed in May 2016. As of that date, the airframe had accrued 501 hours total time (TT) in service. Engine maintenance records indicated that an oil and filter change was accomplished in September 2016, at which time the airframe had accumulated a TT of about 546 hours, and the engine had accumulated a TT since major overhaul of about 945 hours. Review of the maintenance records did not reveal any discrepancies or maintenance activities that could be associated with the accident. The former neighbor who had flown with the pilot in the airplane stated that the airplane flew straight and level "hands off" and that it flew "really well." He also stated that the flight controls were "heavy" and that manipulating them was "like driving a Mack truck." The former neighbor reported that he normally used about 5° to 10° of flap for takeoff in his S-90 and thought that the accident pilot did the same. He was not aware of the accident airplane having a cockpit flap position indicator and thought that the pilot determined the amount of flap deflection visually by looking out the cockpit window. The former neighbor stated that, in his airplane, he used a neutral (tab faired with elevator) pitch trim setting for takeoff, and that the accident pilot used a similar setting. Weight and Balance Information According to the most recent weight and balance documentation located by the investigation, the airplane had an empty weight of 2,163 lbs, and a maximum gross weight of 3,300 lbs. The airplane was equipped with two 15-gallon outboard fuel tanks and two 30-gallon inboard fuel tanks. Calculations using the occupants' weight and two different fuel loads both resulted in a gross weight below the maximum allowable, but with center of gravity (CG) values about 2 inches forward of the allowable envelope. However, the validity of the airplane empty weight/CG, station information, and envelope values could not be independently verified by the investigation. In addition, the exemplar loading conditions were likely representative of the configuration for several previous flights, during which the airplane flew normally. The airplane impacted in marshy ground at the shoreline of the lake located north of the airport. The wreckage came to rest about 70 ft from the initial impact point, and the direction of travel between those two points was 265° true. The accident location was 2,700 ft, on a bearing of 332° true, from the threshold of E79 runway 30. The accident site elevation was about 80 ft below the elevation of E79. The wreckage was found in three major sections, which remained partially attached to one another; the sections were the wings, the engine and cockpit, and the aft fuselage. The two wings remained attached to one another and came to rest leading edge down, with the chordline approximately perpendicular to the ground. The engine and attached propeller were fully immersed in the water and underlying mud/silt, with the significantly deformed and fractured cockpit remnants mostly above the waterline. The aft fuselage came to rest inverted on top of the cabin section. Some cowling and wing fragments were dispersed in the area of the initial impact point, and some of the marsh grass was flattened in this area as well. However, no significant gouges or other ground scars were observed in this region. The forward and lower regions of the cabin were severely disrupted by the impact. Both front seats were fracture-separated from the structure. The available evidence indicated that both occupants were using their seat belts and shoulder harnesses and that those restraint systems remained intact and fastened during the impact. The airplane was equipped with a total of four integral wing fuel tanks. All four tanks were breached but retained their caps in their respective filler necks. No fuel was observed the day after the accident. Wing leading edge damage was continuous along the entire span of both wings, consistent with a laterally-symmetric wing leading edge impact in the aft (chordwise) direction. The two electrically-controlled and -actuated trailing edge flaps remained fully attached to their respective wings. The left flap drive remained connected to the actuator, but the right flap drive was fracture-separated at the flap fitting. Damage precluded determination of the impact flap setting. The ailerons remained fully attached to their respective wings, and all aileron control system fractures were consistent with one-time impact-related overload fractures. All aileron balance weights were present. The left aileron weights were found partially displaced from their normal orientation due to a fractured rod that normally secured the weights. The aileron weights were retained for further laboratory examination. The laboratory findings are discussed later in this report. The horizontal and vertical stabili