WPR17FA065

The pilot's continued visual flight rules flight into instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain. Contributing to the accident were the pilot's inadequate preflight weather planning and his poor decision-making.

The noninstrument-rated private pilot was making a 220-nautical mile (nm) cross-country flight under visual flight rules over mountainous terrain in dark night instrument meteorological conditions. Radar data revealed that the airplane was flying in a northwest direction, proceeding en route between 9,100 ft and 9,900 ft mean sea level (msl). The last radar return, which occurred about 1 hour after takeoff, showed that the airplane was about 80 nm northwest of the departure airport and about 3 nm southeast of the accident site. A short time later the airplane impacted remote, snow-covered, mountainous terrain on a southwest heading at an elevation of 7,350 ft. The changes in heading and altitude between the end of the radar data and the impact suggest that the pilot began maneuvering the airplane after radar contact was lost. A survey of the accident site revealed that the damage to the airplane and the linear debris path was consistent with controlled flight into terrain. All airplane components necessary for flight were accounted for at the accident site. Additionally, a post-accident examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal evidence of any mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Weather surveillance radar revealed an area of snow showers over the accident site, and an infrared satellite image depicted a band of low stratiform clouds over the accident site with tops near 14,000 ft msl. The cloud bases were estimated at 8,700 ft msl.  A meteorological impact statement for the area warned of marginal visual flight rules to instrument flight rules conditions in snow showers. Dark nighttime conditions existed with no illumination of the moon at the time of the accident. The area surrounding the accident site was uninhabited, and there would have been no ground lighting visible to the pilot. It is likely that the airplane encountered instrument meteorological conditions (the band of clouds), and the pilot descended and turned to exit the cloud layer but was unable to establish visual contact with the ground before impacting terrain in the dark nighttime conditions. There was no record of the pilot getting an official weather briefing. If he had gotten a briefing, he would have been told "VFR not recommended" and this may have prevented the accident.

The Office of the Medical Examiner, Utah Department of Health, Taylorsville, Utah, performed an autopsy on the pilot. The examination revealed that the cause of death was blunt force injures. Toxicology testing by the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, was negative for all substances tested. The National Weather Service (NWS) Surface Analysis Chart for 2000 on February 25, 2017, depicted a stationary front located across central Arizona with a high-pressure system over northern Utah. The accident site was located north of the front in an area with a weak pressure gradient. The surrounding station models over Utah indicated light north and west winds with variable cloud conditions from overcast to clear skies, and one station to the northwest of the accident site reporting light continuous snow. Weather surveillance radar revealed an area of snow showers over the accident site, and an infrared satellite image depicted a band of low stratiform clouds over the accident site with tops near 14,000 ft msl. The cloud bases were estimated at 8,700 ft msl. A NWS composite radar image for 2040 depicted several clusters of very light intensity echoes over southern Utah, which were consistent with snow showers. An area of echoes of very light intensity was located immediately east of the accident site and north of the departure airport. The presence of the echoes was consistent with an area of clouds and restricted visibility along the route of flight and potential localized mountain obscuration conditions. The NWS's Center Weather Service Unit at the Salt Lake City air traffic control center (ZLC) issued a meteorological impact statement at 1136 that was valid until 2100. The statement was applicable to the accident area and indicated widespread marginal visual flight rules/instrument flight rules conditions in snow with low ceilings and visibility, and gusty surface winds in the northern ZLC area. These conditions were forecast to spread south and east through the afternoon and into Sunday night. The Panguitch Municipal Airport (U55) was located about 12 nm south-southeast of the accident site at an elevation of 6,763 ft msl and had an automated weather observation system (AWOS) that broadcast weather locally. The observation issued immediately after the accident was as follows: Panguitch weather at 2059, automated, wind from 040° at 3 knots (kts), visibility 10 statute miles, few clouds at 3,900 ft above ground level (agl), overcast ceiling at 4,800 ft agl, temperature -3°C, dew point -6°C, and altimeter 29.99 inches of mercury. At 2053, the weather reporting station at the Bryce Canyon Airport (BCE), Bryce Canyon, Utah, located about 28 nm southeast of the accident site at an elevation of 7,590 ft msl, reported wind 250° at 5 kts, visibility 10 statute miles, sky clear, temperature -7°C, dew point -6°C, and altimeter 29.87 inches of mercury. At 2040, the weather reporting station at the Milford Municipal Airport (MLF), Milford, Utah, located about 40 nm north-northwest of the accident site at an elevation of 5,042 ft msl, reported wind 350° at 10 kts, visibility 9 statute miles, light snow showers, few clouds at 2,200 ft agl, overcast clouds at 4,000 ft agl, temperature -2°C, dew point -4°C, and altimeter 29.95 inches of mercury. Astronomical data from the United States Naval Observatory for Panguitch on February 25 indicated that sunset was at 1821, and the end of civil twilight was at 1847. Moonrise was at 0711, and moonset was at 1842. At the time of the accident at 2049, both the sun and moon were more than 15° below the horizon and provided no illumination. The investigation found no evidence that the pilot had received a weather briefing before departing from PGA for the flight to U42. The pilot held a private pilot certificate with a single-engine land airplane rating. The pilot did not hold an instrument rating. He was issued a third-class FAA medical certificate, which was issued on September 18, 2015, with no limitations. A review of the pilot's logbook revealed that he had accumulated a total of 176.9 hours of flight time as of December 29, 2016, which was the date of the last logbook entry. Additionally, the pilot had logged 113 hours as pilot-in-command, 65.3 hours of cross-country flight time, 10.5 hours of night flight time, and 120 hours of flight in the same make and model as the accident airplane. Additionally, the pilot's logbook revealed that he had flown about 6 hours within the preceding 90 days, with no time recorded in the last 30 days. The airplane was a four-place, high-wing, single-engine, 1966 Cessna 172H, serial number 17255207. It was powered by a 145-horsepower Continental O-300-D six-cylinder reciprocating engine, serial number 34931-D-6-D, and equipped with a two-bladed McCauley constant-speed propeller. Maintenance records indicated that the most recent annual inspection was completed on April 14, 2016, at a recorded tachometer time of 7,239.75 hours, a recorded engine total time of 6,678.87 hours, and 1,577.14 hours since its last major overhaul. The last maintenance entry was dated October 8, 2016, at a tachometer time of 7,334.27 hours. The entry indicated that a new oil sump gasket was installed after troubleshooting an oil leak. The tachometer indicated 7,372.64 hours at the time of the accident. On the morning of February 28, 2017, investigators from the NTSB and the FAA, assisted by members of the Iron County Sheriff's Department, Cedar City, Utah, surveyed the accident site. The survey revealed that the airplane had initially impacted snow-covered mountainous terrain in a nose-low attitude on a southwest heading at an elevation of about 7,358 ft msl. The airplane subsequently came to rest in a ravine about 206 ft from the initial point of impact at an elevation of about 7,237 ft msl. The airplane was severely fragmented and deformed during the accident sequence. Onsite documentation was hampered by the snow-covered terrain, as well as active snow showers throughout the day. All necessary components for flight were accounted for at the accident site. The accident site was characterized by sparse vegetation, and there were no close inhabited dwellings. The fuselage was observed in many sections with both wings separated from the fuselage. The empennage was observed with all flight controls attached. All flight control cables were accounted for at the accident site. There was no evidence of postcrash fire. Airplane and engine components observed in the initial debris path consisted of the engine's carburetor, the left door post, the right wingtip, the nose landing gear strut, and the intake air box. Additional components identified about halfway down the debris field included the nose landing gear wheel/tire, part of the engine cowling, magneto assembly, and part of an aileron. The last third of the debris field included the left cabin door, a main landing gear wheel/tire, the emergency locator transmitter, a fuel tank, and the engine. The propeller was located about 135 ft west of the main wreckage site. The outboard section of the left wing was located about 25 ft east of the main wreckage. The left fuel gauge was reading off-scale high, and the right gauge was reading just above one-half tank full. The wreckage was recovered to a secured salvage facility for further examination, which revealed the following information. The cabin and cockpit areas were both destroyed by impact forces during the accident sequence. The left wing sustained impact damage throughout its span with the outboard 4 ft having separated during the impact sequence. The wing strut remained attached to the wing but separated from the fuselage and was observed bent due to impact forces. The left flap was bent and twisted and remained attached to the wing's trailing edge at all attach points. The flap was observed in the up/retracted position. The