WPR18FA112

The pilot's exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack during takeoff, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall/spin.

About 7 months before the accident flight, the private pilot had resumed flying his single-engine airplane following an approximate 3-year hiatus. He flew seven flights and then successfully completed a flight review with an instructor. On the morning of the accident, the pilot had his airplane refueled and departed on a visual flight rules flight to a nearby airport.  Surveillance video and witness reports indicated that the pilot took off from the nearby airport and the airplane climbed out in a nose-high attitude and on an unusually steep flight path before entering an aerodynamic stall and spin. The airplane was destroyed, and the pilot was fatally injured.  It could not be determined how many previous landings and takeoffs the pilot conducted on that flight, or whether the accident takeoff followed a touch-and-go or a full-stop landing. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any evidence of mechanical deficiencies or failures that would have prevented continued normal engine and airplane operation.  Because the pilot successfully departed from his home airport and flew to the accident airport, it is unlikely that there was a static center of gravity (CG) problem with the airplane. No evidence of any large mass in the cabin (other than the pilot) that could significantly alter the CG in flight was observed during the wreckage examination. The airplane's pitch trim was found set in the takeoff range, and no mechanical flight control deficiencies were observed, making it unlikely that the airplane configuration or a control problem resulted in the steep climb.   It is possible that the pilot's seat inadvertently slid aft during the accident takeoff, and either caused the pilot to pull back on the control yoke and/or prevented him from applying appropriate control inputs to lower the nose to prevent the stall and spin, however, there was insufficient evidence to determine the pilot's seat position either before or at the time of impact.   Given that the airplane was within CG, and there were no anomalies with the trim or flight controls, it is likely that the pilot exceeded the airplane's critical angle of attack. The airplane's low altitude at the time of the stall and the rapid spin development likely prevented the pilot from being able to affect a recovery prior to ground impact.

The Monterey County Sheriff's Office, Coroner Division, autopsy report indicated that the cause of death was "multiple blunt force trauma," and that alcohol and drug test results were all negative. Forensic toxicology on specimens from the pilot was performed by the FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory; results were negative for carbon monoxide, ethanol, and tested-for drugs. The 1054 automated weather observation at Monterey Regional Airport (MRY), Monterey, California, located 7 miles southwest of OAR, included wind from 110° at 3 knots, visibility 10 miles, clear skies, temperature 6°C, dew point 4°C, and an altimeter setting of 30.16 inches of mercury. One pilot/witness at OAR reported that the wind at the time of the accident appeared to be from about 260° to 270° at about 10 knots. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records indicated that the pilot, age 85, held a private pilot certificate with an instrument-airplane rating. Review of the pilot's logbook revealed that he had a total flight experience of about 2,650 hours. He ceased flying in mid-2014 due to a family illness and resumed in August 2017. The logbook indicated that he had accrued about 22.6 hours since then, all of which were in the accident airplane. The first 8.1 of those hours were dual instruction with a flight instructor, including a flight review on November 22, 2017. The flight instructor owned and operated a Mooney M20E similar to the accident airplane, and the pilot was referred to the instructor by their common maintenance facility. Between August 25 and November 22, the instructor flew with the pilot a total of 8 times and then conducted and endorsed the pilot's flight review. All flights were in the accident airplane, and all originated at WVI. The instructor noted that, at first, the pilot was "rusty" but that he regained his proficiency in the airplane. At some point early in the re-currency training, the pilot had difficulty extending the landing gear, but he did eventually master that procedure. The pilot preferred to not conduct touch-and-go landings, and when flying with the instructor, the pilot always preferred full-stop landings with a taxi back for takeoff. The instructor stated that the pilot's "go-arounds were well-managed." The airplane impacted and came to rest just southwest of the intersection of runway 29 and taxiway C, offset about 300 ft from the runway centerline. The impact site was located on a flat grassy area between the runway and a parallel taxiway. The only ground scars were a small crater from the propeller and engine, and two shallow impressions from the two wing leading edges. The upright wreckage was primarily confined to an area slightly larger than the length and wingspan of the airplane. The wreckage was documented on scene and in additional detail after recovery. Significant portions of the cockpit and cabin and their contents were heavily damaged or consumed by fire. No evidence of any large or heavy baggage or other cabin contents was observed. The wings and the steel-frame fuselage structure exhibited substantial impact crush damage. The outboard wing sections and the empennage were not significantly damaged by the fire. All major components were accounted for on scene. Both wings bore full-span leading edge crush damage in the aft direction. All flight control panels/surfaces remained attached to their respective primary structures. The ailerons, elevators, and rudder were intact. The left flap was impact damaged and slightly fire damaged. The right flap was partially consumed by fire. Flight control continuity in all 3 axes, including pitch trim, was confirmed between the respective aerodynamic surfaces and their cockpit controls. The airplane was equipped with an aftermarket deployable spoiler assembly on each wing; both the left and right spoiler panel sets were found in their retracted positions. The pitch trim was found set to the takeoff position. The flap setting at impact could not be determined. The landing gear was found in the retracted position. Although impact and fire damage precluded a complete determination of the pre-accident integrity and functionality of all engine and propeller components, no evidence of pre-impact mechanical deficiencies or failures that would have precluded continued operation was observed. The outboard seat track for the left (pilot's) forward seat remained partially intact and was examined to determine the possible longitudinal position of the seat during the accident. The track contained seven holes. The seat was found set with the pin in the 5th hole back from the front of the track. General The airplane was manufactured in 1965 and was equipped with a Lycoming IO-360 series engine. The pilot purchased the airplane in 1990 and had kept it hangared at WVI since 1999. Maintenance records indicated that the most recent annual inspection was completed on September 22, 2017. As of that date, the airplane had a total time (TT) in service of about 3,517 hours, and the engine had a TT of about 792 hours. The airplane was not approved for intentional spins. Landing Gear The M20E has a manual landing gear retraction/extension system activated by a large lever (sometimes referred to as a "Johnson bar") located between the two front seats. The lever pivots about 90° at a point on the floor below the instrument panel. The motion of the lever is through an arc parallel to the longitudinal axis of the airplane. When the lever is up/vertical, the landing gear is extended; when lever is down/horizontal, the landing gear is retracted. Gear retraction requires the lever to be pivoted aft and down; gear extension is accomplished via the opposite motion. The lever has a locking button and a slide collar for activation and locking for both the gear-extended and gear-retracted positions. Pitch Trim and Flaps The pitch trim is manually controlled and actuated by a handwheel on the cockpit floor between the two front seats. The wheel rotates in the vertical plane parallel to the airplane longitudinal axis. Rotation of the trim wheel operates a chain that operates a jackscrew that changes the angle of incidence of the empennage, and concurrently actuates the pitch trim position indicator. The pitch trim position indicator is located on a central subpanel that is below the primary instrument panel. The pitch trim position indicator is situated above the flap position indicator. The hydraulic flaps are manually controlled and actuated. Flap extension is a two-step process; first, the flap lever is set to the desired flap position, and then the flaps are extended by manually pumping the flap handle. Flap retraction is commanded via the flap lever and actuated by springs and airloads; the pilot does not need to pump the flap handle. The flap position indicator is on the central subpanel just below the pitch trim position indicator. Both the trim and flap indicator systems used mechanically driven pointers moving relative to fixed scales. Takeoffs in the airplane are typically conducted with half flaps, and landings are typically conducted with full flaps. In flight, flap extension results in an airplane-nose-down (AND) moment, which requires airplane-nose-up (ANU) trim to reduce or alleviate control forces. With landing flaps extended, the airplane typically requires significant ANU trim. Go-arounds, therefore, require significant AND re-trimming to reduce or alleviate adverse ANU control forces. Takeoff and Stall Speeds According to the manufacturer's owner's manual (OM), takeoff is accomplished by applying back pressure on the yoke "at about 65-75 mph airspeed." The airplane will adopt a nose-high attitude until back pressure is released. Best angle climb speed is 94 mph, and best rate of climb speed is 113 mph at sea level. Once airborne and placed in the proper pitch attitude, the airplane will accelerate rapidly to a speed well above the liftoff sp