WPR19FA025

The pilot's spatial disorientation and subsequent loss of control after takeoff in dark night instrument meteorological conditions.

Before departing on the night instrument flight rules (IFR) flight, the pilot asked another pilot at the airport about the published IFR departure procedure he intended to use after takeoff. The pilot and passenger subsequently departed on the filed flight plan. Radar data depicted that the accident airplane started to drift to the left of the runway while still flying over it. The left drift continued beyond the departure end of runway 34.  About 0.43 mile north of the airport, the airplane began a right turn and started to descend from 500 ft above ground level (agl). The last radar target was located near the accident site, at an altitude of 100 ft agl.  A video obtained from a security camera, located about 1 mile southwest of the accident site, captured the accident airplane in a descending right turn until the view of the airplane was lost behind a tree line. A review of the pilot's flight records revealed that he held an instrument rating and had logged 3.6 hours in the last 6 months. However, there was no record of the pilot obtaining an instrument proficiency check within the 12 months before the accident. Examination of the airframe and engines did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction. It is likely that the pilot experienced some level of spatial disorientation as the airplane turned during takeoff in the dark night conditions with smoke and haze, which led to a loss of control and impact with terrain.

Examination of the pilot's logbook revealed the first entry was dated January 22, 2015. As of that date, the pilot had accumulated a total of 1,628 flight hours; 191 of which were accumulated at night, and 72.2 were instrument flight hours. The last entry, dated October 16, 2018, indicated a total flight time of 1,773.8 hours, and the pilot had accumulated an additional 19 hours of night flight and 9.1 hours of actual instrument time. During the 6 months within that period, the pilot flew 3.6 hours of actual instrument time. In addition, the pilot flew to and from RDD twice; those flights were conducted during day visual flight rules conditions. There was no entry in the logbook that indicated the pilot flew any instrument departure procedure from RDD. His last flight review was conducted on May 28, 2018, and it included 4 landings and 1.3 hours of flight time; however, it did not appear that any of the flight time included night, actual instrument, or simulated instrument time.  The Shasta County Medical Examiner's Office, Shasta, California, performed an autopsy of the pilot and the passenger. The cause of death for both was blunt trauma. No significant natural diseases were identified. The FAA's Forensic Sciences Laboratory conducted toxicology tests on specimens from the pilot and the passenger. The results were negative for all tests performed; no drugs were identified in blood and no potentially impairing substances were found in urine, liver, or muscle. The initial examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane impacted terrain .75-mile northeast of the departure end of runway 34 and cartwheeled before coming to rest upright. The wreckage was spread along a 275-ft-long debris path through dry, grassy terrain on an approximate heading of 115° magnetic. The first point of impact (FPOI) was a ground scar about 12 inches long, which contained a piece of right-wing structure. Pieces of the outboard right wing were scattered along the path from the FPOI to the main wreckage, which was located about 280 ft southeast from the FPOI. The main wreckage consisted of the engine, the majority of both wings, cabin, fuselage, and the empennage. The engine was separated from the firewall and exhibited numerous impact signatures. The firewall and the instrument panel were crushed together and compressed downward; the instrument panel exhibited extensive damage. The carburetor heat lever was observed fully in. The throttle lever was observed ¾ out. The master switch was on and the ignition key was in the off position. Both cabin doors were detached from the fuselage and located along the debris path. The left and right wings exhibited leading edge crush damage over the full length of the wings. Both wings remained partially attached to the fuselage through cables, except for the aileron balance cable that was separated due to overstress. Both fuel tanks were breached in multiple locations, and a strong odor of fuel was present at the site. In addition, both wings had fuel splash marks on their surfaces. The vertical stabilizer, rudder, horizontal stabilizer, and elevators remained attached to the empennage. Flight control cable continuity was established from the control surface bell cranks to the cockpit area. The flap actuator was measured and found to be in the up position. The elevator trim tab actuator was measured and found to be in the 10° tab up position. The three-blade propeller was located about 164 ft from the FPOI and 109 ft from the main wreckage. All three blades were observed with tip damage, large leading-edge gouging and polishing. One blade was bent aft and had a piece of the No. 5 cylinder rocker arm imbedded in the leading edge. The spinner was crush damaged around the hub. The engine was rotated manually and all rocker arms, valve springs, and valves moved normally except cylinder No. 5 whose rocker arms separated, and the intake valve stem was bent due to impact forces. There was corresponding movement of the accessory gear in the rear of the engine when the engine was rotated. The top and bottom spark plug electrodes displayed coloration consistent with normal operation. The left magneto produced spark at all leads. The right magneto's electronic ignition module was impact damaged and could not be tested. There was no evidence of pre-impact mechanical anomalies or malfunctions of the engine or the airframe. The Engine Data Monitor (EDM) unit was recovered from the wreckage and sent to the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Laboratory for examination. No unusual data were recovered from the unit. On November 15, 2018 about 1827 Pacific standard time, a Cessna 182K airplane, N2629R, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Redding, California. The pilot and the passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The pilot filed an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan from Redding Municipal Airport (RDD) to Sacramento Executive Airport (SAC), Sacramento, California, using the KENDL3 departure. According to a witness (another pilot who was at the same fixed base operator at RDD), before departure the pilot asked him “what is the KENDL3?”. The witness responded that he had just flown the HOMAN2 departure and suggested the pilot look at that departure instead. He informed the pilot he needed to make a right turn after departure. Shortly after, the witness heard over the radio that the pilot requested from the tower controller to change the flight plan from the KENDL3 departure to the HOMAN2 departure; however, the controller instructed the pilot to refile his flight plan or make their request with Oakland Center. The pilot then received the IFR clearance release as filed (with the KENDL3 departure). As the witness waited for his turn to take off, he noticed that, during the accident airplane’s initial climb, the pilot made a left turn instead of a right turn; he reported that the KENDL3 departure required a right turn immediately after departure. Flight track data was obtained from L3/Harris OpsVue, a commercially available web-based product that aggregates and geo-reference's Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) surveillance data sources. The data revealed that the RDD air traffic controller cleared the accident pilot for takeoff on runway 34.  Radar data depicted a primary target consistent with the accident airplane start to drift to the left of the runway while still flying over the runway. The left drift continued beyond the departure end of runway 34.  The data further showed that the airplane began a right turn and started to descend from about 500 ft above ground level (agl), about 0.43 mile north of RDD.  The last radar target was recorded near the accident site, at an altitude of 100 ft agl.  A video obtained from a security camera located on top of a building, about 1 mile southwest of the accident site, captured the accident airplane in a descending right turn until the view of the airplane was lost behind a tree line. A witness, located about 660 ft southeast from the accident site, reported that he heard a sound consistent with the engine being advanced to full power. The witness turned around and observed the airplane's red and green wingtip lights. The witness said that the airplane appeared to be in level flight based on the lights; however, he could not see the airplane due to very low visibility and the dark environment. Shortly after, the witness observed wingtip lights "flipover as the airplane was in a roll" and the airplane started descending straight toward the ground. The witness further stated that the "sound drastically decreased as if the engine power decreased,” right before the airplane impacted the ground. FAA Regulation, Part 61.57 (c), states the following: no person may act as pilot-in-command under instrument flight rules (IFR) or in weather less than the minimum prescribe