WPR19FA084

The pilot’s decision to continue the visual flight rules flight into instrument meteorological conditions and icing conditions which resulted in a high rate of descent and impact with terrain. Contributing to the accident was the inaccurate weather reporting from the airport weather reporting facility.

The noninstrument-rated pilot departed on a visual flight rules (VFR) 336 nautical mile (nm) cross-country flight to the northwest in a direct path toward the destination airport. Shortly after departure, the pilot advised air traffic control that he would be diverting to the south for weather; a cold front was passing over the route of flight, in which both VFR and instrument meteorological conditions (IFR) prevailed. About 1 hour and 27 minutes into the flight, the controller suggested to the pilot that in order to circumvent the weather, he fly from his present position southwest to an alternate airport, where he could then turn north to his destination; at this time the alternate airport was about 154 nm southwest of his position. The pilot subsequently advised the controller that he was “…going north to go under [the] deck in about 50 miles. Over the next several minutes, the airplane descended, followed by the controller advising the pilot that he was going in and out of radar contact. The controller provided the pilot a heading to the previously advised alternate airport which was reported as VFR. The pilot arrived at the alternate airport terminal area about 25 minutes after his decision to divert. Witnesses reported that the weather was below VFR minimums, with a solid ceiling of 200 ft above ground level, and visibility between 1/4 and 1/2 mile with snow. They also reported hearing the pilot click his microphone several times to activate the pilot-controlled runway lights. The pilot stated that if he could see the runway he could land, to which one of the witnesses informed the pilot that the runway lights were on. There were no further communications with the pilot. Onboard recorded data revealed that for about the last 10 minutes of flight, the pilot entered the airport terminal area south of the airport on a westerly heading at an altitude of 9,000 ft msl. He subsequently made a 90° right turn toward the north, followed by multiple right and left turns over the airport area at altitudes of between 7,100 ft msl to 7,800 ft msl; the airport elevation was 6,259 ft msl. The pilot then proceeded toward the northeast in a climbing right turn, most likely to proceed eastbound toward a more favorable airport. At this time, it was estimated that the pilot had about 2 hours of fuel remaining, an adequate fuel supply to divert back to the east about 80 nm where a myriad of airports were located that were operating under VFR conditions. However, in an attempt to ascend over a ridgeline to the east of more than 10,750 ft msl, upon reaching an altitude of about 9,400 ft msl, the airplane entered a descending right turn at a rate of descent of about 6,400 ft per minute and an indicated airspeed of about 210 kts, which is consistent with a high rate of descent. As icing was present in the area at the time of the accident, airframe icing most likely precipitated the stall, followed by entering the right spin and subsequent impact with terrain about 3.4 nm northeast of the airport at an altitude of about 6,929 ft msl. The airplane was not authorized for flight into known icing conditions. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.    The diversion airport’s ASOS visibility sensor was reporting visibilities which were inaccurate for weeks leading up to the accident, as well as on the day of the accident. The ASOS was scheduled to be repaired that day; however, the technician who was to perform the maintenance was unable to do so due to the weather conditions. Because snowfall intensity reporting was dependent on the visibility observation, inaccurate visibility reporting likely resulted in an unrepresentatively low reported snowfall intensity on the day of the accident. Although the erroneous visibility information provided by the ASOS may have contributed to the pilot’s decision to divert to the airport, as a noninstrument-rated pilot, it remained incumbent upon the pilot to maintain VFR conditions while maneuvering in an attempt to land. Had the pilot been aware of the impending instrument meteorological conditions that he was about to encounter he might have diverted to an airport with better conditions. According to Flight Services, neither they nor any third-party vendors had any contact with the accident pilot.

According to the manufacturer, the airplane was originally equipped with an Avidyne Multi-Functional Display (MFD), an Avidyne Primary Functional Display (PFD), an S-TEC 55X autopilot, and two Garmin GNS430 units. The airplane had also been retrofitted with an Avidyne DFC90 autopilot. The airplane's MFD was capable of providing the pilot with a visual weather display, should the pilot elect to use it; however, the MFD was not located within the main wreckage or in the debris field. As such, it could not be determined whether the pilot was using the MFD as he approached ELY, nor was it able to be determined the level of proficiency the pilot possessed in the use the weather display. The annual inspection entry stated that the pitot-static and transponder tests were due April 30, 2019. The Cirrus Design SR22 Pilot Operating Handbook for the accident airplane make and model, Section 2, Limitations states, “Flight into known icing conditions is prohibited. According to the airplane manufacturer, the accident airplane make and model cannot maintain flight at an airspeed of less than 50 knots. The Clark County Coroner, Las Vegas Nevada, performed an autopsy on the pilot. The cause of death was attributed to multiple blunt force injuries. An NTSB Medical Officer reviewed the toxicological report for the pilot and reported the following: toxicology testing performed for the Clark County Coroner’s office and the FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory detected the anti-depressant amitriptyline and its metabolite nortriptyline in liver tissue; nortriptyline was also detected in muscle tissue by the FAA laboratory. The FAA laboratory detected the psychoactive compound mitragynine, its psychoactive metabolite 7-hydroxymitragynine, and the sedating antihistamine cetirizine in the pilot’s liver and muscle tissue. Two over-the counter, non-impairing pain medications, acetaminophen (commonly marketed as Tylenol) and naproxen (commonly marketed as Aleve) were detected in liver and/or muscle tissue by the coroner’s laboratory and FAA laboratory, respectively. Toxicology performed for the Clark County Coroner’s office on the pilot’s liver tissue was positive for ethanol at 1.4 grams per hectogram (gm/hg); testing performed by the FAA laboratory was negative for ethanol in the pilot’s brain and muscle tissue. Amitriptyline is a prescription medication used to treat depression, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, headaches, and panic, phobia, and eating disorders. It carries the warning that its use may impair mental and physical abilities required to perform hazardous tasks. Its metabolite is nortriptyline, which also has anti-depressant properties and carries the same warning. Mitragynine and 7-hydroxymitraginine are the primary psychoactive compounds found in the leaves of the southeast Asian kratom tree. It has stimulant effects at low doses, such as increased alertness, physical energy, and talkativeness, and sedative effects at high doses. It is considered a drug of concern by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has asked the DEA to attempt to place the drug into Schedule I drugs with high potential for abuse and no medical value similar to heroin. The FDA has not approved mitragynine for any medical use. Cetirizine is a second-generation antihistamine used to relieve hay fever and allergy symptoms. It is available over the counter, commonly marketed as Zyrtec. Although designed to be less sedating, cetirizine does have some sedating properties. FAA provides guidance on wait times before flying after using this medication. Ethanol is a social drug commonly consumed by drinking beer, wine, or liquor. It acts as a central nervous system depressant: it impairs judgment, psychomotor functioning, and vigilance. Ethanol is water soluble, and after absorption it quickly and uniformly distributes throughout the body’s tissues and fluids. The distribution pattern parallels water content and blood supply of the tissue. Ethanol can be produced after death by microbial activity. The airplane wreckage was consistent with the airplane impacting shallow, upsloping, snow-covered terrain in an upright and right wing low attitude at an elevation of 6,929 ft msl about 3.4 nm northeast of ELY. All major components of the airplane necessary for flight were accounted for at the accident site. The initial point of impact comprised a roughly 5-ft-wide by 12-ft-long by 6-inch-deep crater; a debris path extended about 473 ft from the crater on a magnetic heading about 065°. The firewall and instrument panel had separated from the fuselage and exhibited impact damage. Two composite propeller blades were observed in the debris field; both blades exhibited impact damage. The propeller hub was not observed or recovered. The engine was separated from the firewall, with most of the accessories observed separated from the engine. Examination of the induction system, ignition system, fuel and oil systems, and borescope examination of the cylinders revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The carry-through wing spar was separated from the fuselage. The left side of the spar, torque box structure, and wing skins were present. The right side of the spar, the torque box structure, and wing skins were fragmented. Both fuel tanks were breached. The ailerons and flaps had separated from their respective wing and exhibited impact damage. Flight control continuity was established from the cockpit through overload separations or cuts made to facilitate recovery. The Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) enclosure panel was located in the debris field. A fragment of the aircraft roof, which contained the CAPS activation handle and handle holder was observed in the debris field. The rocket motor remained in the launch tube with its frangible link intact. The parachute enclosure was separated from the bulkhead and the parachute was observed on the ground in the immediate vicinity and remained in a packed state. No anomalies were noted with the CAPS system. On February 15, 2019, about 1730 Pacific standard time, a Cirrus SR22 airplane, N917SR, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Ely, Nevada. The pilot and passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight. The pilot and passenger departed on the cross-country flight from Craig-Moffat Airport (CAG), Craig, Colorado, about 1425, with a planned destination of Joslin Field-Magic Valley Regional Airport (TWF), Twin Falls, Idaho, about 336 nautical miles (nm) to the northwest. Visual and instrument meteorological conditions (VFR & IFR) prevailed over the route at this time, as a cold front was moving over the area. Air traffic control radar and communications information provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revealed that the pilot contacted air traffic control shortly after departure and requested visual flight rules (VFR) flight-following services to TWF. He also stated that he would "have to go quite a ways south of direct because of convection." As the airplane proceeded west, then southwest, at an altitude of about 17,500 ft mean sea level (msl), the pilot reported to the air traffic controller that he planned to turn north upon reaching Salt Lake City, Utah. About 1552, or 1 hour and 22 minutes into the flight, and after discussing with the pilot his intent to deviate around the weather by continuing southwest, the controller suggested that the pilot proceed direct to Ely, Nevada (ELY) before continuing to TWF. At this time the airplane was about 154 nm east-northeast of ELY and about 217 nm south-southeast of TWF; TWF was about 192 nm north of ELY. The pilot replied, “I hadn't planned to go as far west as Ely but if that's what I have to do I can." About 1616, while still at an altitude of 17,700 ft msl, th