WPR24FA156

The pilot’s decision to continue flight into icing conditions and inclement weather, which likely led to spatial disorientation when he attempted to divert from the planned course to the destination airport.

The non-instrument-rated pilot departed for the destination airport to attend an aerobatic camp. The airplane followed an interstate through a mountain pass while generally maintaining an altitude of 1,500 ft above ground level (agl). As the airplane continued along the canyon, it began to climb while its airspeed slowed, likely the pilot’s response to entering an area of higher terrain while avoiding clouds. The airplane reached an altitude of about 7,000 ft mean sea level (msl) and an airspeed of 103 kts. The airplane began descending and its speed increased to over 185 kts. The airplane then leveled off briefly before beginning a steeper descent. The airplane then made a 90° left turn and the airspeed decreased while it continued the descent. The airplane impacted terrain in a near-vertical attitude. Postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of a mechanical malfunction or failure. The examination found evidence consistent with the pilot, who was wearing a parachute, having his seatbelt fastened at impact, which indicates he did not attempt to bail out and suggests he did not perceive the airplane to be uncontrollable. Weather data indicated that, during the last 2 minutes of flight, the airplane was likely operating in instrument meteorological conditions above 3,000 ft msl and encountered icing conditions above 5,400 ft. Forecast information applicable to the accident time included moderate icing above 5,000 ft msl and mountain obscuration due to clouds and mist. There is no record of the pilot obtaining a weather briefing before departure. However, he had commented to the owner of the accident airplane that he might not be able to complete the flight as planned due to weather, indicating an awareness of potential overcast conditions. The pilot had flown through the pass on numerous occasions and likely felt comfortable with the route. The altitude and airspeed changes during the final 2 minutes of flight are consistent with the pilot attempting to remain clear of clouds while maintaining terrain clearance. After the airplane climbed, it likely encountered icing conditions. Although the reason for the pilot’s left turn could not be determined, the turn occurred while the airplane was in the cloud layer and likely accumulating ice, and it is possible he was attempting to reverse course while descending. The decrease in altitude while approaching the mountain peak, the drastic changes in airspeed, and then the sharp left turn followed by a sudden descent are consistent with the pilot becoming spatially disoriented and entering an aerodynamic stall. The pilot held the required FAA waiver for the aerobatic camp and was the only person authorized to activate the aerobatic area. This responsibility may have created self-induced pressure to complete the flight despite the adverse weather conditions.

The pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land and glider. He held a BasicMed medical certificate issued on May 15, 2023, with the limitation that corrective lenses were required for distant vision and glasses must be available for near vision. He was associated with International Aerobatic Club Chapter 67 and was the waiver holder for the Ephrata aerobatic camp. According to the pilot’s logbook, at the time of the accident he had accumulated 1,313.5 total hours of flight experience, 6 hours of which were accumulated in the 90 days before the accident. He had extensive aerobatic experience. The pilot logbooks revealed that the pilot flew from Arlington to Ephrata through Stampede Pass on at least two occasions since October 2021. The routes he flew through the pass on those two occasions were similar to the route of the accident flight. The airplane owner stated that the pilot had flown the route from Arlington to Ephrata through the pass many times, typically following I-90. It is unknown if the pilot was aware of the weather forecast conditions before departure. There is no record of the pilot reviewing weather information from either Leidos or ForeFlight. After making arrangements with the airplane’s owner the day before the accident to move the airplane to his own hangar, the pilot stated to the owner that the weather forecast was “iffy for getting to Stampede Pass,” so he would likely depart the day of the accident or possibly the next morning. Aerobatic Camp The pilot was scheduled to attend an aerobatic camp that started the day after the accident. This camp was structured for one group of pilots to participate for the first three days, followed by another group for the next three days. The first group of pilots were scheduled to land on the day of the accident to receive a briefing at 1600 and to sign in. The pilot indicated to the airplane’s owner that he planned to get up on the morning of the accident and wait for favorable weather, mentioning he might have to wait until May 22 or 23. His camp was scheduled to start on May 22. He told the camp’s organizers that his wife was driving to the airport with the FAA-required Certificate of Waiver (CoW) to be signed at the briefing. About 1450 on the day of the accident, one of the camp’s organizers asked the pilot if he would be at Ephrata that day to help give the briefing. The pilot responded that he would not make the briefing. The aerobatics training camp required a CoW from the FAA, which was issued to the pilot. The CoW detailed the conditions and responsibilities under which the camp was allowed to conduct aerobatic flight activities in the designated area near the airport, including compliance with specific safety and operational provisions; it stipulated that failure to adhere to the conditions could result in the cancellation of the waiver and legal penalties. The CoW stated, “The holder of this certificate shall be responsible for the strict observance of the terms and provisions contained herein” and that the pilot was the only person “authorized to activate and deactivate” the aerobatic area; no other people were delegated this authority. Review of the airplane’s records revealed that the most recent annual inspection was completed on September 30, 2023, at an airframe total time of 1,002 hours. The most recent recorded maintenance was replacement of the tailwheel on May 15, 2024, at an airframe total time of 1,016.8 hours. According to the airplane’s flight manual, the published stall speeds at a weight of 870 kg were 57 kts at wings level, 61 kts at 30° of bank, and 68 kts at 45° of bank. The flight manual states that flight into known icing conditions is prohibited. It instructs the pilot to immediately exit icing conditions by turning back or changing altitude to reach an outside air temperature less conducive to ice accumulation. It further directs the pilot to plan to land at the nearest suitable airfield. An autopsy was conducted on the pilot by the King County Medical Examiner’s Office. The cause of death was reported as multiple blunt force injuries. Toxicological testing of postmortem specimens, performed by the FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory, did not reveal any drugs of abuse. On May 19, 2024, at 1649 Pacific daylight time, an Extra Flugzeugbau GMBH EA 300/L airplane, N22MW, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Bandera, Washington. The pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.   The pilot was planning to attend an annual International Aerobatic Club (IAC) aerobatic training camp in Ephrata, Washington. The pilot recently had a mishap with his own airplane, an Extra NG, where it was damaged when the canopy opened during takeoff. Because the accident pilot’s airplane was in maintenance, the owner of the accident airplane offered to lend the pilot his airplane to use for the aerobatic camp. The pilot had flown the airplane before and was covered by the owner’s insurance.    A review of ADS-B data revealed that the airplane departed Arlington Municipal Airport (AWO), Arlington, Washington, about 1627. The airplane proceeded south-southeast until intersecting Interstate 90 near Snoqualmie, Washington. The airplane then began to follow I-90 through a mountain pass while generally maintaining an altitude of 1,500 ft agl (see figure 1). The canyon walls along the mountain pass reached up to 5,500 ft msl.   Figure 1. Flight path in reference to the destination airport   About 1647, the airplane entered a 1,500-feet-per-minute climb, with its groundspeed gradually decreasing from 170 kts to 130 kts over a 20-second period. At 1648, the airplane passed to the south of Bandera State Airport (4W0) after reaching an altitude of about 7,000 ft msl and an airspeed of 103 kts. The airplane began to descend and its speed increased to over 185 kts (see figure 2). The airplane leveled off briefly and then began another, steeper descent. During the final seconds of recorded data, the airplane began a 90° left turn and the airspeed decreased while it continued the descent. The last recorded data point was at 1649:06 and showed that the airplane was at 4,500 ft and 120 kts. When the airplane did not arrive at Ephrata, an alert notice was issued, and the wreckage was located the following morning near the final ADS-B position. Figure 2. End of flight track The accident site was located on a north-facing slope of densely forested mountainous terrain at an altitude of about 3,100 ft msl. The airplane came to rest among densely populated cedar and fir trees that reached 150 ft agl. The site varied in slope between 45° and 60°. Numerous branches directly above the main wreckage displayed fresh breaks, and the top of one small fir tree had been severed. None of the nearby trees showed evidence of impact to their trunks.   The debris field was estimated to be 100 ft in diameter, with the main wreckage in the center. The debris field consisted of pieces of clear plastic, fragmented composite, paint chips, and propeller splinters. The main wreckage included the engine, fuselage, wings, and empennage. The empennage was folded over the fuselage in a scorpion-like position. Both wings came to rest partially embedded in topsoil and remained attached to the fuselage. The wing skin panels were fragmented and distributed throughout the wreckage field, and the leading edges exhibited extensive crushing and fragmentation. The main wing spar was fractured in multiple locations, with the outboard portions of both wings exhibiting the greatest crush deformation. Both ailerons were fragmented, with only the inboard sections identifiable. The right aileron inboard section remained attached to its fitting; however, the control rod and bellcrank assembly were loose within the