WPR24LA068

Airport personnel’s failure to properly prioritize their response actions, including updating the airport’s automated weather observation system recording in a timely manner to notify incoming pilots of a runway closure, which resulted in an airplane striking an immobilized airplane on the runway during landing at night. Contributing to the accident was the airport’s inadequate emergency response plan.

The pilot was conducting a return flight at night to his original departure airport on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. Before departing he checked the weather at his destination and the Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) and there were no restrictions to returning to the non-towered airport. After the pilot departed for his destination, a second pilot landed at the destination airport after business hours. That pilot lost control during landing and that airplane slid off the side of runway 27 and came to rest with the left wing partially blocking the runway. That pilot contacted flight service (FS), who notified the airport manager of the blocked runway and issued a notice to airmen (NOTAM) that the runway was closed. Airport personnel were contacted to respond to the disabled airplane and a resident near the airport was contacted to monitor the airport’s common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) and notify any inbound aircraft that the runway was closed. The first airport employee to arrive at the airport proceeded to the disabled airplane so he could transport the pilot and his dog to the airport terminal. After they returned to the terminal, a second airport employee arrived. The first employee and the pilot then returned to the disabled airplane to take photographs. The second employee remained at the terminal to watch the pilot’s dog. Airport personnel did not immediately update the Automated Weather Observation System (AWOS) recording to warn incoming aircraft of the runway closure or put closed runway lighting in place on the runway. While enroute, the pilot checked the weather and AWOS and there were no warnings of the runway closure at his destination. Due to the reported weather and because there was not an instrument approach approved for night use at his destination, he instead changed his plan and route of flight to fly an instrument approach to a nearby airport to use it as a waypoint, then cancel IFR once he was below the weather and continue the flight to his original destination under visual flight rules(VFR). The pilot did not inform air traffic control (ATC) of his plans, nor was he required to, so they did not provide available NOTAM information that the runway was closed at his destination. The pilot flew the IFR approach, canceled his IFR clearance and proceeded to the destination airport under VFR as planned. The pilot rechecked the AWOS as he neared the destination airport and made a 10-mile position call on the CTAF. The airport resident monitoring the airport’s CTAF frequency heard someone attempt to activate the runway lights and heard the pilot’s 10-mile position call. The resident attempted to contact the pilot on the radio multiple times, but did not receive a reply. Airport personnel, who had handheld and vehicle mounted radios, did not hear either the pilot’s or the resident’s radio transmissions. The pilot did not hear any radio transmissions on the Unicom frequency warning of the runway closure and subsequently landed. He was unaware of the airplane blocking the runway until he hit it. The left winglet on the landing airplane had impacted the airplane blocking the runway, substantially damaging the landing airplane’s left aileron. The airport’s emergency response plan did not provide for specific actions to be taken by personnel in the event of a non-accident runway closure event. The emergency response plan was updated following this accident with specific actions for personnel to take in the event of an aircraft accident or incident, including the issuance of a NOTAM and updating AWOS to advise of any closure or hazard at the airport. The airport manager stated it would take about 5 minutes for someone inside the terminal to update the AWOS. The pilot made reasonable attempts to determine the status of the airport before landing. There was insufficient evidence to determine why the pilot did not hear the resident attempting to warn him of the runway closure. The accident is consistent with airport personnel not properly prioritizing their actions in response to the disabled airplane in order to prevent another airplane from landing on the closed runway.

On January 7, 2024, at 2019 Pacific daylight time, a Cessna 421C, N421TP, sustained substantial damage when it was involved in an accident near Carson City, Nevada. The pilot was not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 positioning flight. The pilot of N421TP reported that he flew from Carson City Airport (CXP), Carson City, Nevada, to Van Nuys Airport (VNY), Van Nuys, California. He refueled at VNY and then departed about 1820 on an IFR flight plan with CXP as the filed destination. About 1826 a Piper PA-46, N819RL, landed at CXP. That airplane subsequently departed the runway due to icy runway conditions, spun 180° and came to rest adjacent to the active runway with the left wing partially blocking the runway. The pilot contacted Flight Service shortly after that incident to notify them that the runway was partially obstructed. N421TP checked in on frequency with Oakland ARTCC (ZOA) about 1859. About 1913, Flight Service issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) stating there was an unsafe disabled aircraft affecting runway 09/27 at CXP and notified the airport manager. About 1915, the airport manager notified an airport employee of the disabled airplane (N819RL) on the runway. The airport manager requested Flight Service to issue another NOTAM that the runway was closed, which was issued about 1925. About 1936, the airport manager contacted a resident adjacent to the airport and requested he monitor the airport’s CTAF and warn any inbound aircraft of the runway closure. The airport employee arrived at the airport about 1938 and proceeded to N819RL to meet the pilot. According to the pilot of N421TP, he checked the Automated Weather Observing System (AWOS) at CXP while enroute. Due to the weather reported at CXP and because there were no instrument approaches approved for night use at CXP, he elected to fly an instrument approach to Minden-Tahoe Airport (MEV), cancel IFR enroute, and continue the flight to CXP under VFR. About 1947, he changed his destination with ZOA. The pilot did not inform ZOA of his intentions to cancel IFR once he descended below the weather and resume his flight to CXP, nor was he required to. About 1954, the airport employee transported the pilot of the disabled airplane to the airport terminal due to cold weather. About 1955, the ZOA controller provided NOTAM information for MEV, and the pilot reported he had the weather for MEV. About 1959, ZOA instructed the pilot to descend to 14,000 ft, and cleared the pilot to fly an instrument approach about 2004. The pilot reported that he rechecked the AWOS at CXP about this time. The pilot advised ZOA that he had the airport in sight and canceled his IFR flight plan about 2006. A second airport employee arrived at the airport about 2008. He reported that the first airport employee who had responded and the pilot of the disabled airplane went to the disabled airplane to take pictures, and he remained at the airport terminal in order to care for the pilot’s dog. The first employee could not recall what time he returned to the terminal after taking pictures, but believes he was either driving back to the terminal, or at the terminal, when the accident occurred. The pilot reported that he had transmitted his intention to land at CXP on the CTAF when about 10 mi from the airport. He rechecked the AWOS and transmitted his position again on the CTAF, as he overflew CXP to the north. The airport resident monitoring the CXP CTAF on a handheld radio reported he heard five clicks on the radio to activate the runway lights and heard the pilot of N421TP announce a 10-mile-out notice for landing runway 27. The resident then made four or five separate radio calls on the CTAF asking, “aircraft landing at Carson, do you copy?” but did not hear a response from the pilot acknowledging the radio calls. The pilot stated he did not hear any radio transmissions on the CXP CTAF and subsequently landed on the blocked runway. He was unaware of the airplane blocking the runway until he heard a “thump” during landing. The left winglet on the landing Cessna 421 impacted the left wing of N819RL, substantially damaging N421TP’s left aileron. The pilot then taxied the airplane to a hanger and parked. The first airport employee, who was at the terminal, received a report of the accident from a fixed-base-operator employee about 2033. He then added a voice message to the recorded AWOS message advising that the runway was closed about 2040. He stated he had a handheld radio and a radio in the truck, and that he did not hear the accident pilot or the airport resident make any radio calls. Airport staff flew a similar flight profile as the accident airplane the day after the accident to test the resident’s handheld radio’s transmission capability. The resident said he could hear the staff’s radio transmissions at ten miles, but they did not hear his transmissions until the airplane was within 7 or 8 miles of the airport. The CXP airport emergency response plan stated the airport manager or their designee is responsible for coordinating “the closing of the airport when necessary and initiate the dissemination of relevant safety-related information to aviation users (NOTAMs).” The plan further stated under the Alert 3 Accident Classification Response section (fire department response to an accident), “Airport staff should issue applicable NOTAMs and ensure appropriate CTAF advisories are communicated.” The airport emergency response plan did not provide for specific actions to be taken by personnel in the event of a non-accident runway closure event. The airport possessed lighted runway closure markings to be placed on the runway warning pilots in the event of a runway closure; however, they were not positioned on the runway as a result of the disabled airplane on the runway. Airport personnel stated the signs were not difficult to install but required personnel to be available in order to move them into place. Following this accident, CXP personnel updated the airport emergency response plan to include a checklist directing specific actions for personnel to take in the event of an aircraft accident or incident, including the issuance of a NOTAM and updating AWOS to advise of any closure or hazard at the airport.